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This Article identifies nearly one hundred articles and provi-
sions in Louisiana’s first civil code, the Digest of 1808, which were 
copied verbatim or almost verbatim (that is, literally or almost lit-
erally) from three French legal encyclopedias popular during the 
Ancien Régime: Lerasle’s Encyclopédie méthodique: Jurisprudence 
(8 vols., 1782–89), Jean-Baptiste Denisart’s Collection de décisions 
nouvelles (1st ed., 6 vols., 1754–56), and Joseph-Nicolas Guyot’s 
Répertoire de jurisprudence (2d ed., 17 vols., 1784–85). As the Ap-
pendix indicates, verbatim and almost verbatim extracts from Ler-
asle, Denisart, and Guyot constitute approximately five per cent of 
the Digest’s source material. This Article therefore serves as a sup-
plement (and partial corrective) to Rodolfo Batiza’s 1971 and 1974 
studies of the Digest’s “actual sources”.   
 The present study argues that the Digest’s primary redactor, 
Louis Moreau Lislet, borrowed language from French legal ency-
clopedia entries largely for pedagogical purposes, including intro-
ducing into Louisiana’s new civil code civilian definitions and other 
material that would be useful for lawyers and judges trained in the 
common law. As a result, Louisiana’s first civil code possesses a 
didactic quality that is absent from its Napoleonic prototype. 
Equally important, this study suggests that earlier scholars’ as-
sumptions that the Digest’s source material reflects Louisiana’s 
mixed Spanish-French legal history should be revisited: while dis-
covery of a significant presence of French legal encyclopedic 
sources certainly reveals the drafter’s preference for, and familiar-
ity with, ancien droit legal literature, it further undermines previous 
assumptions about the widespread indirect influence of Roman and 
Spanish-Castilian sources.  
 
Keywords: codification, ancien droit, encyclopedias, legal lexicog-
raphy, Louisiana. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a 1971 study, Professor Rodolfo Batiza of Tulane Law School 
famously purported to identify the “actual sources” of Louisiana’s 




first civil code, the Digest of 1808.1 According to Batiza, most of 
these sources were French.2 In particular, Batiza found that more 
than 70% of the Digest’s provisions had been copied from just three 
French-language texts: the Code Napoléon (1804), its draft Projet 
of Year VIII (1800), and Domat’s Loix Civiles (1689).3 In a 1974 
revised study, Batiza found additional evidence of verbatim borrow-
ing from several other French-language sources, including Joseph-
Nicolas Guyot’s popular ancien droit legal encyclopedia, the Réper-
toire de jurisprudence (1784–85).4 Based on his 1971 and 1974 
studies, Batiza later concluded that the Digest’s primary redactor, 
the New Orleans lawyer Louis Moreau Lislet (1767–1832),5 had 
used “definitions and additional rules borrowed from the works of 
Domat, Pothier, and [French] legal encyclopedias” to supplement 
Digest provisions taken from the Code civil and projet.6 In contrast, 
 
 1. See Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources 
and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4, 11 (1971) [hereinafter Batiza 1971] 
(claiming to identify almost 97% of the Digest’s “actual sources”). 
 2. See id. at 12 (concluding that French sources “account for about 85 per-
cent” of the Digest’s sources). 
 3. See id. at 11 & nn. 42–43, 45 (attributing 1,495 provisions to “verbatim” 
or “almost verbatim” equivalents in the Code Civil, Projet, and Domat, or approx-
imately 72% of the 2,081 sources identified in the 1971 study). 
 4. See RODOLFO BATIZA, 3 SOURCES WHICH HAD A SUBSTANTIAL OR PAR-
TIAL INFLUENCE ON PROVISIONS OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1808: THE 
ORIGINAL TEXTS (1974) [hereinafter BATIZA 1974] (identifying “about 40 provi-
sions” taken from Guyot’s Répertoire de jurisprudence, Ferrière’s French trans-
lation of Justinian’s Institutes, and Antoine Desgodets’ Les loix des bâtimens). As 
in BATIZA 1974, all citations to Guyot in the present study are for the second 
edition: JOSEPH-NICOLAS GUYOT, RÉPERTOIRE UNIVERSEL ET RAISONNÉ DE JURIS-
PRUDENCE CIVILE, CRIMINELLE, CANONIQUE ET BÉNEFICIALE (1784–85) [herein-
after GUYOT]. 
 5. According to Batiza, Moreau Lislet was the Digest’s “sole drafter,” not-
withstanding the formal appointment of another lawyer, James Brown, as co-re-
dactor. See Rodolfo Batiza, Justinian’s Institutes and the Louisiana Civil Code of 
1808, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1639, 1644 (1995) [hereinafter Justinian’s Institutes] (dis-
cussing Brown’s joint appointment). This Article assumes Moreau Lislet’s pri-
mary agency, although the degree of Brown’s contribution remains a subject of 
dispute. See John W. Cairns, Spanish Law, the Teatro de la legislación universal 
de España e Indias, and the Background to the Drafting of the Digest of Orleans 
of 1808, 31 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 79, 88–90 (2017) (providing evidence of an 
uneven division of labor rather than a “sole drafter” hypothesis). 
 6. Batiza, Justinian’s Institutes, supra note 5, at 1641 (emphasis supplied).  




Batiza attributed less than 10% of the Digest’s provisions to Louisi-
ana’s pre-Purchase Spanish law.7   
Although Batiza’s 1974 study identified only a handful of arti-
cles in the Digest taken from Guyot’s répertoire, the Louisiana 
Code’s debt to French legal encyclopedic literature is far more sub-
stantial than Batiza initially realized. The present study identifies for 
the first time nearly one hundred additional Digest provisions copied 
“verbatim” or “almost verbatim” from Lerasle’s Encyclopédie 
méthodique: Jurisprudence (8 vols., 1782–89)8 and Jean-Baptiste 
Denisart’s Collection de décisions nouvelles (1st ed., 6 vols., 1754–
56),9 two French legal encyclopedias that Moreau Lislet owned dur-
ing his lifetime and cited in court, as well as additional provisions 
borrowed from Guyot’s répertoire that Batiza’s 1974 study omit-
ted.10  
Of Moreau Lislet’s three principal French legal encyclopedic 
sources, the Encyclopédie méthodique was undoubtedly the most in-
fluential. This now-forgotten multi-volume legal encyclopedia con-
tained many of the law-related entries first published in Denis Dide-
rot’s original Encyclopédie (28 vols., 1751–56), which Diderot’s 
successor as publisher, Charles-Joseph Panckoucke, had entrusted 
to a law professor, M. Lerasle, for revision, and then sold to French 
lawyers as an eight-volume set.11 Importantly, Moreau Lislet relied 
on verbatim or almost verbatim extracts from the Encyclopédie 
méthodique to draft over seventy Digest articles on topics as wide-
ranging as things, usufruct, partition by licitation, pledge, hypothec, 
 
 7. Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 12–13.  
 8. M. LERASLE, ENCYCLOPÉDIE MÉTHODIQUE: JURISPRUDENCE (1782–89) 
[hereinafter Encyc. Juris.]. 
 9. Unless otherwise noted, citations in the present study are for the 9th edi-
tion: J[EAN] B[APTISTE] DENISART, COLLECTION DE DÉCISIONS NOUVELLES 
(1775) [hereinafter ANCIEN DENISART]. 
 10. For individual source attributions to Lerasle, Denisart, and Guyot, see 
Appendix (table of sources).  
 11. For discussion of Panckoucke’s republication of Diderot’s Encyclopédie 
in subject-specific encyclopedias, including the compilation of the Encyclopédie 
de jurisprudence, see George B. Watts, The Encyclopédie Méthodique, 73 PAPERS 
MOD. LANG. ASSOC. 348, 364–65 (1958). 




dowry, compromise, and possession. Many of these provisions were 
later adopted in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 and some survive 
practically unchanged in the current Civil Code. Via Lerasle’s vol-
umes, the redactor introduced scores of rules and definitions from 
Diderot’s Encyclopédie into Louisiana civil law.12  
This Article argues that Moreau Lislet’s verbatim reliance on 
French legal encyclopedic literature was neither accidental nor 
merely ornamental. Rather, the redactor copied entries from Lerasle, 
Denisart, and Guyot for distinctly pedagogical purposes, including 
introducing ordinary readers (many trained in the common law) to 
basic civil law concepts using ready-made French-language defini-
tions; augmenting Digest provisions taken from the French Civil 
Code and Domat with additional rules; and providing useful advice 
to litigants lacking formal legal training.13 Strategic borrowing from 
legal encyclopedia entries reveals Moreau Lislet’s ambition to draft 
a civil code that would serve as both a coherent body of legislation 
for Louisiana as well as an accessible introduction to the civil law 
tradition.14 
The redactor’s extensive reliance on French legal encyclopedic 
sources also has important implications for ongoing investigations 
into the possible influence of Roman and Spanish law on the Di-
gest’s redaction. During the years prior to Batiza’s 1971 study, Lou-
isiana legal scholars had engaged in intensive speculation about the 
mixed origins of the Digest and the nature of its substantive rela-
tionship to Louisiana’s pre-Purchase Spanish-Castilian law. 
Batiza’s studies were intended to resolve this debate by identifying 
the “actual” French-language sources for most of the Digest’s arti-
cles, as well as non-verbatim Roman, French, and Spanish explana-
tions for the Digest’s remaining provisions. However, comparison 
of the present study’s verbatim source attributions (to Lerasle, Den-
isart, and Guyot) with Batiza’s proposed non-verbatim Spanish 
 
 12. See Parts III & IV, infra.  
 13. See Part IV, infra.  
 14. See Part V, infra.  




source attributions from 1971 and 1974 indicates that many of 
Batiza’s non-verbatim sources are wrong and that Spanish and Ro-
man sources were probably less influential in the Digest’s redaction 
than even Batiza initially conceded. More importantly, Moreau Lis-
let’s repeated preference for verbatim copying from French legal lit-
erature, especially ancien droit sources with which he was familiar 
from practice, strongly suggests that the redactor’s choice in source 
material was less cosmopolitan than Louisiana legal historians have 
previously assumed.15 
II. MOREAU LISLET’S FRENCH LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIAS: THE 
CODIFIER’S ANCIEN DROIT PRACTICE TOOLS 
On December 19, 1832, the notary Louis T. Caire prepared an 
inventory of Moreau Lislet’s personal library; the “Man Behind the 
Digest” had died a few weeks earlier.16 In his testament, the redactor 
left over 1,000 volumes, mostly law books, to his executor, Jean 
Baptiste Desdunes.17 Among the numerous titles left by Moreau Lis-
let, Caire’s inventory listed the following four works and volume 
numbers: “Collection de décisions (13)”, “Encyclopédie de Juris-
prudence (8)”, “Collection de décisions (4)”, and “Répertoire de Ju-
risprudence (17)”.18 
Although Caire’s inventory provides little bibliographical detail, 
the four titles are nevertheless identifiable from contemporary evi-
dence. In Greffin’s Ex’r v. Lopez (La. 1817), Martin’s Reports rec-
ords Moreau Lislet appearing before the Louisiana Supreme Court 
and referring the judges to “4 Denisart’s Decisions de Jurisprudence, 
 
 15. See Parts V & VI, infra.  
 16. See Agustín Parise, A Translator’s Toolbox: The Law, Moreau-Lislet’s 
Library, and the Presence of Multilingual Dictionaries in Nineteenth-Century 
Louisiana, 76 LA. L. REV. 1163, 1172 (2016). For the honorific title Man Behind 
the Digest, see Alain Levasseur’s excellent biography of Moreau Lislet: ALAIN 
LEVASSEUR, MOREAU LISLET: THE MAN BEHIND THE DIGEST OF 1808 (rev. ed. 
with Vicenç Feliú, Claitor’s 2008).  
 17. See Parise, supra note 16, at 1172 & nn. 69–70. 
 18. See Mitchell Franklin, Libraries of Edward Livingston and of Moreau 
Lislet, 15 TUL. L. REV. 401, 405–06 (1941) (reproducing Caire’s inventory). 




570, verbo turpitude,” while shortly before his death, the drafter ap-
peared in De Armas v. City of New Orleans (La. 1833), where he 
made reference to “6 Nouveau Denisart, p. 593. Verbo domaine, 
&c.”19 The first citation’s volume and page numbers match the 9th 
edition (4 vols., 1775) of Denisart’s Collection de décisions; the sec-
ond refers to Calenge’s 13-volume continuation (1783–1807) of 
Denisart’s original work, sometimes called Nouveau Denisart.20 
These are almost certainly the “Collection de décisions (4)” and 
“Collection de décisions (13)” listed in the Caire inventory. 
Similar evidence confirms Moreau Lislet’s ownership of Ler-
asle’s Encyclopédie méthodique: Jurisprudence. This multi-volume 
work was part of the Paris publisher Charles-Joseph Panckoucke’s 
larger project to republish Diderot’s Encyclopédie in subject-spe-
cific sets. To compile the “encyclopédie de jurisprudence” volumes, 
Panckoucke appointed a special committee of French legal lexicog-
raphers, chaired by the law professor M. Lerasle, who together ex-
tracted, revised, and expanded the original law-related entries found 
in the first Paris folio of the famous Encyclopédie. Primarily the 
work of François-Vincent Toussaint (1715–1772) and Antoine-Gas-
pard Boucher d’Argis (1708–1791), two French-jurists-turned-Di-
derot collaborators, the original entries in the Encyclopédie had con-
tained numerous references to French coutumes and Roman law and 
proved popular with French lawyers.21 There is no evidence that 
Moreau Lislet ever owned the Paris folio, which was both rare and 
 
 19. See Greffin’s Ex’r, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 145, 148 (La. 1817) (citing ANCIEN DEN-
ISART for turpitude); De Armas, 5 La. 132, 140 (1833) (citing NOUVEAU DEN-
ISART for domaine). 
 20. Compare id. with 4 ANCIEN DENISART 570 (1775) (turpitude); JEAN-BAP-
TISTE DENISART, 6 COLLECTION DE DÉCISIONS NOUVELLES 593 (1787) (domaine) 
[hereinafter NOUVEAU DENISART]. 
 21. See Lerasle, Avertissement in 1 Encyc. Juris. v (1782) [hereinafter Aver-
tissement] (discussing editorial process); Luigi Delia, Le droit dans l’Encyclopé-
die. Cartographies, enjeux, collaborateurs, 48 RECHERCHES SUR DIDEROT ET SUR 
L’ENCYCLOPÉDIE 143 (2013) (discussing Toussaint’s and Boucher d’Argis’ con-
tributions to Diderot’s encyclopedia and providing additional biographical de-
tails). 




expensive.22 However, according to the early law reports, the redac-
tor cited “3 Encyclopédie de Jurisprudence, 74, verbo Communes” 
in Orleans Navigation Co. v. City of New Orleans (La. 1812) and “2 
Encyc. Jurisp. 579, 580, verbo Chemin” in Renthorp v. Bourg (La. 
1816).23 Both citations match the eight-volume Panckoucke set, 
confirming that the “Encyclopédie de Jurisprudence (8)” in the 
Caire inventory is the same title. 
Finally, the “Répertoire de Jurisprudence” listed in the Caire in-
ventory is presumably the second edition of Guyot’s highly es-
teemed work of the same name. Moreau Lislet had relied on Guyot’s 
répertoire in the famous dispute between Edward Livingston and 
the citizens of New Orleans over ownership of the New Orleans bat-
ture; in his scholarly Mémoire au soutien des droits des Etats-unis 
à la Batture du faubourg Ste Marie (1808), the redactor cited the 
répertoire’s entry on alluvion in defense of the government’s prop-
erty interests.24 Interestingly, Guyot had earlier served on Lerasle’s 
revision committee.25 Moreau Lislet was apparently aware of 
Guyot’s influence on the compilation of the Encyclopédie 
méthodique: in Morgan v. Livingston (La. 1819), the Louisiana re-
dactor referred to Lerasle’s volumes as “Guyot’s Encyclopedia.”26 
 
 22. Cf. Franklin, supra note 18 (Caire inventory). For estimate of the number 
of copies outside France in late 1700s, see Robert Darnton, The Encyclopédie 
Wars of Prerevolutionary France, 78 AM. HIST. REV. 1331, 1332 (1973). 
 23. Compare Orleans Nav. Co., 2 Mart. (o.s.) 214, 216 (La. 1812) (Moreau 
citing “verbo Communes”) and 3 Encyc. Juris. 74 (1783) (commune); Renthorp, 
4 Mart. (o.s.) 97, 117 (La. 1816) (Moreau citing “verbo Chemin”) and 2 Encyc. 
Juris. 579 (1783) (chemin).  
 24. See 3 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Retirement series, 12 August 
1810 to 17 June 1811, at 174 (J. Jefferson Looney ed. 2006) (Moreau citing 
Guyot’s répertoire, along with Denisart and Lerasle). 
 25. See Avertissement, supra note 21, at vi. 
 26. See Morgan, 6 Mart. (o.s.) 19, 27 (Moreau citing “1 Guyot’s Encyc. 288; 
verbo Alluvion.”). 




III. LERASLE, DENISART, AND GUYOT: THREE “ACTUAL SOURCES” 
OF THE DIGEST OF 1808 
Moreau Lislet was familiar with Lerasle, Denisart, and Guyot 
for another important reason: he had used these same sources dec-
ades earlier to draft many of the Digest’s rules and definitions. In 
1806, Louisiana’s Creole-dominated legislature had appointed Mo-
reau Lislet and fellow lawyer James Brown (1766–1835) to compile 
a French-language “civil code” for use in the new Territory of Orle-
ans.27 In an effort to forestall the reception of the Anglo-American 
common law, the legislature instructed the two redactors to make 
the “civil law by which this territory is now governed, the ground 
work of said code.”28 A legacy of the new territory’s recent colonial 
past, post-Purchase Louisiana “civil law” was still primarily Span-
ish-Castilian derecho indiano.29 Its principal sources included the 
Siete Partidas (1265), Nueva Recopilación (1567), and Recop-
ilación de las Indias (1680), supplemented by treatises such as Juan 
de Hevia Bolaños’ Curia Philipica (1603) and José Febrero’s Libre-
ría de escribanos (1783), as well as the Corpus Juris Civilis of Ro-
man law.30  However, despite the legislature’s instructions, Moreau 
Lislet and Brown’s finished project mysteriously resembled a mod-
ern French code, not a traditional Spanish compilation.31 In 
 
 27. See HENRY PLAUCHÉ DART, THE SOURCES OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUI-
SIANA 44 (1911); John Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law, 6 TUL. L. REV. 
280, 281 (1932) (quoting June 7, 1806 resolution appointing Moreau Lislet and 
James Brown as redactors). 
 28. John T. Hood, Jr., The History and Development of the Louisiana Civil 
Code, 19 LA. L. REV. 18, 24 (1958) (quoting resolution); see also Alain A. Le-
vasseur, The Major Periods of Louisiana Legal History, 41 LOY. L. REV. 585, 
610–28 (1996) (reviewing political developments leading up to Moreau Lislet and 
Brown’s appointment). 
 29. Id. at 590–609.  
 30. See KATE WALLACH, RESEARCH IN LOUISIANA LAW 203–218 (1958) 
(providing bibliographical overview of Spanish sources in pre-Purchase Louisi-
ana); see also M.C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW 
INSTITUTIONS IN SPANISH AMERICA, Part 1 (2004) (discussing sources of law in 
Spanish Americas). 
 31. See John Randall Trahan, The Continuing Influence of le Droit Civil and 
el Derecho Civil in the Private Law of Louisiana, 63 LA. L. REV. 1019, 1026 




structure, the Digest had the “classic three-book arrangement” of the 
Institutes of Gaius and the Code Napoléon, while in phraseology, 
Batiza’s 1971 study confirmed the drafters’ near-complete reliance 
on French-language models.32 Indeed, Batiza attributed less than 
10% of the Digest’s provisions to the “possible influence” of non-
verbatim provisions in the Partidas, Curia Philipica, and Febrero.  
Consistent with Batiza’s earlier findings of the redactors’ over-
whelming reliance on French-language models, the Appendix to this 
study identifies for the first time nearly one hundred additional Di-
gest provisions that Moreau Lislet copied verbatim or almost verba-
tim (i.e., literally or almost literally) from French legal encyclope-
dias, specifically Lerasle’s Encyclopédie méthodique (74 Digest 
provisions); Denisart’s Collection de décisions and/or Nouveau 
Denisart (12 provisions); and Guyot’s répertoire (2 additional pro-
visions); as well as three provisions taken from either Lerasle or 
Guyot.33 For reasons that will become evident later, no attempt has 
 
(2003) (describing Digest as “heavily indebted to the French civil-law tradition” 
for its “form” and “structure”).  
 32. See Vernon Valentine Palmer, The French Connection and the Spanish 
Perception: Historical Debates and Contemporary Evaluation of French Influ-
ence on Louisiana Civil Law, 63 LA. L. REV. 1067, 1074 (2003) (discussing Di-
gest’s “classic three-book arrangement” and resemblance to Code Napoléon); see 
also Olivier Moréteau, The Louisiana Civil Code in French: Translation and Re-
translation, 9 J. CIV. L. STUD. 223, 230–31 (2016) (noting similarities in Digest’s 
structure and Institutes of Gaius). 
 33. See Appendix to the present study (table of sources). In some instances, it 
was not possible to distinguish between two phraseologically-similar encyclope-
dia entries, especially where sources exhibit a mutual reliance on an earlier (some-
times recognizable, sometimes indeterminate) third source. Indeed, Lerasle and 
Guyot had both copied from the Paris folio, as well as from each other. See 
Avertissement, supra note 21, at vi (Lerasle, justifying the Encyclopédie 
méthodique’s copying from Guyot’s first edition, while also noting that Guyot had 
borrowed entries in his 1775–83 répertoire from Diderot). For this reason, many 
of Batiza’s 1974 attributions to Guyot’s répertoire are actually for provisions that 
come from Lerasle. For example, Batiza wrongly attributed Bk. III, Tit. I, Art. 
172, a verbatim equivalent of 5 Encyc. Juris. 593, ¶ 1 (on licitation), to an “a.v. 
(in part)” provision in Guyot’s répertoire; likewise, he attributed Bk. III, Tit. XX, 
Art. 2, a verbatim equivalent of 6 Encyc. Juris. 247, ¶ 2 (on occupancy), to a 
“substantially identical” provision found in Guyot. However, in both cases, Ler-
asle has the stronger claim on the basis of phraseological resemblance and identi-
cal paragraph structure.  




been made to trace the possible non-verbatim influence of French 
legal encyclopedia entries on the rest of the Digest. 
As a whole, the findings in the Appendix’s table of source at-
tributions are significant: in total, ancien droit encyclopedia entries 
constitute the Digest’s most-influential genre of source material af-
ter the French codes and ancien droit commentators,34 accounting 
for almost 5% of the 1808 code’s 2,000 or so provisions, while Ler-
asle’s Encyclopédie méthodique is the Digest’s fourth most fre-
quently copied verbatim source after the Code civil, the Projet of 
Year VIII, and the Loix Civiles.35  
To illustrate the redactor’s technique, Table 1 provides a repre-
sentative example of Moreau Lislet’s verbatim use of entries in 
French legal encyclopedias to draft articles for Louisiana’s first civil 
code. Table 1 begins by reproducing in column 1 the official French-
language text for Articles 1–3 in Book III, Title XX (of Occupancy, 
Possession and Prescription).36 The three articles define the civilian 
concept of occupation, or novel possession, as well as the Roman-
influenced “cinq manières” of acquiring property by occupancy.37 
 
 34. Compare the present study (Appendix identifying 90 provisions taken 
verbatim or almost verbatim from French legal encyclopedic literature) with 
Batiza’s 1971 study, which identified 1,531 source attributions for French legis-
lation (the Code civil, projet, Custom of Paris, and Ordinance of 1667) and 306 
source attributions for French commentators (Domat, Pothier, and Do-
mat/Pothier). Cf. Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 11–12 & n.47.  
 35. With respect to verbatim and almost verbatim source attributions (i.e., 
excluding hypothetical non-verbatim relationships), Batiza’s 1971 study traced 
713 Digest provisions to the Projet of Year VIII, 675 to the Code civil, and 107 to 
Domat’s Loix Civiles. See Batiza 1971, at 11 & nn. 42–43, 45. Lerasle’s 71 ver-
batim or almost verbatim source attributions therefore rank fourth, well ahead of 
Pothier (32 almost verbatim provisions). Cf. Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 11 & 
n.46. 
 36. All French-language Digest references are to the original Bradford & An-
derson edition, A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY 
OF ORLEANS (1808) [hereinafter Dig. Orl.], published online by the LSU Center 
of Civil Law Studies (CCLS), available at https://perma.cc/R77Q-N69Z. For dis-
cussion of CCLS’ Digest Online Project, see Agustín Parise, The Digest Online 
Project: A Resource to Disseminate the Legal Heritage of Louisiana, 12 J. CIV. 
L. STUD. 283 (2020); Olivier Moréteau & Agustin Parise, The Bicentennial of the 
Louisiana Civil Code (1808-2008), 2 J. CIV. L. STUD. 195, 197–98 (2009). 
 37. See, e.g., J. Inst. 2.1.12. Cf. David V. Snyder, Possession: A Brief for 
Louisiana’s Rights of Succession to the Legacy of Roman Law, 66 TUL. L. REV. 
1853 (1992) (discussing similarity of Articles 2 and 3 in Title XX with rules of 




Meanwhile, column 2 provides nearly-verbatim equivalents of Arti-
cles 1–3 from the entry on ‘Occupation’ in the Encyclopédie 
méthodique.38 Finally, column 3 reproduces two paragraphs from 
Boucher d’Argis’ original entry on the same subject in the Paris fo-
lio; the two paragraphs in column 3 suggest the indirect phraseolog-





Dig. Orl. 1808, Book 
III, Title XX 
6 Encyc. Juris. 247 
(1786) [Lerasle] (‘Occu-
pation’) 
11 L’Encyc. 335 (1765) 
[Diderot] (‘Occupation’) 
Art. 1er. L'occupation est 
une manière d'acquérir, 
suivant laquelle les 
choses qui n'appartien-
nent à personne, passent 
au pouvoir et en la pro-
priété de celui qui s'en 
empare, avec l'intention 
de se les approprier. 
[¶ 1] OCCUPATION, f. f. 
(Droit naturel, des gens, 
& civil.) est un moyen 
d'acquérir, suivant lequel 
les choses qui n'appar-
tiennent à personne, pas-
sent au pouvoir & en la 
propriété de celui qui 
s'en empare, avec l'inten-
tion de se les approprier. 
[¶ 2] Occupation est 
aussi un moyen d’acqué-
rir du droit des gens, sui-
vant lequel les choses ap-
pellées nullius, c’est-à-
dire, qui n’ont point de 
maîtres, & les choses ap-
partenantes aux ennemis 
sont au premier occu-
pant. 
Art. 2. Il est donc néces-
saire pour que l'occupa-
tion soit un moyen légi-
time d'acquisition, que la 
chose occupée n'ait point 
de maître, qu'elle soit de 
[¶ 2] Il est donc néces-
saire, pour que l’occupa-
tion soit un moyen légi-
time d'acquisition, que la 
chose occupée n'ait point 
de maître; qu'elle soit de 
[no equivalent] 
 
Roman law, rejecting Pothier’s candidacy as an “actual source” for these articles, 
and (rightly) concluding that, “[t]he redactors must have relied on the Institutes 
directly, or on some other source.”). 
 38. See 6 Encyc. Juris. 247, ¶¶ 1–3 (1786) (‘Occupation’). 
 39. See 11 DENIS DIDEROT & JEAN LE ROND D’ALEMBERT, ENCYCLOPÉDIE 
OU DICTIONNAIRE RAISONNÉ DES SCIENCES, DES ARTS ET DES MÉTIERS 335, ¶¶ 2–
3 (1765) (‘Occupation’) [hereinafter L’Encyc.].  




Dig. Orl. 1808, Book 
III, Title XX 
6 Encyc. Juris. 247 
(1786) [Lerasle] (‘Occu-
pation’) 
11 L’Encyc. 335 (1765) 
[Diderot] (‘Occupation’) 
nature à être appréhen-
dée ou conservée, et que 
l'occupant la détienne ef-
fectivement sous sa main, 
avec l'intention de la gar-
der. 
nature à être appréhen-
dée & conservée, & que 
l'occupant la détienne ef-
fectivement sous sa main, 
avec l'intention de la gar-
der. 
Art. 3. Il y a cinq ma-
nières d'acquérir ainsi 
par occupation, savoir: 
La chasse aux bêtes 
fauves; 
La chasse à l'oiseau; 
La pêche; 
L'invention, c'est-à-dire, 
lorsqu'on trouve des 
perles sur le bord de la 
mer, des choses aban-
données, ou un trésor; 
Le butin que l'on fait sur 
les ennemis.       
 
[¶ 3] Il y a, suivant le 
droit romain, cinq ma-
nières d'acquérir ainsi 
par occupation; savoir, 
venatus, la chasse aux 
bêtes fauves; aucupium, 
qui est la chasse à l'oi-
seau; piscatio, la pêche; 
inventio, lorsqu'on 
trouve des perles sur le 
bord de la mer, des 
choses abandonnées, ou 
un trésor; enfin, praeda 
bellica, c’est-à-dire, le 
butin que l'on fait sur les 
ennemis. Voyez les instit. 
lib. 2, tit. 1.      
[¶ 3] Il y a, suivant le 
droit romain, cinq ma-
nieres d’acquérir ainsi 
par occupation; sa-
voir, venatus, la chasse 
aux bêtes fauves; aucu-
pium, qui est la chasse à 
l’oiseau; piscatio, la 
pêche; inventio, comme 
quand on trouve des 
perles sur le bord de la 
mer, des choses aban-
données, ou un trésor; 
enfin, præda bellica, 
c’est-à-dire, le butin que 
l’on fait sur les enne-
mis. Voyez les instit. liv. 
II. tit. 1. 
 
As Table 1 reveals, the Encyclopédie méthodique is the clear 
“actual source” for Articles 1–3: the degree of phraseological simi-
larity between Title XX’s definition of occupation and Lerasle’s en-
try on the same topic, as well as the consistency in paragraph struc-
ture (Articles 1–3 in Title XX are practically interchangeable with 
¶¶ 1–3 in Lerasle’s entry), evidence the redactor’s close reliance on 




Lerasle. On the other hand, the drafter’s possible direct dependence 
on Diderot’s original Encyclopédie, or another source based on the 
Paris folio, may safely be excluded; although the definitions in the 
Digest and Diderot are similar with respect to Article 3 (the “cinq 
manières”), Article 1 is closer in style and lexicon to Lerasle, while 
Article 2 has no equivalent at all in Boucher d’Argis’ original en-
try.40 
In retrospect, the fact that Moreau Lislet copied Digest articles 
from Lerasle and other French legal encyclopedias should not be 
surprising; indeed, the drafter was arguably following in the foot-
steps of his French counterparts. As Batiza noted elsewhere, the 
“number of works used by the draftsmen [of the French Civil Code] 
was quite impressive” and included not only institutional literature 
but also “several legal multi-volumed encyclopedias such as those 
by Denisart and Guyot.”41 Batiza even claimed that the First Cam-
bacérès Projet of 1793 could be “reconstructed almost in its entirety” 
with texts from Domat, Pothier, Denisart’s Décisions nouvelles, and 
Guyot’s répertoire.42 In other words, the French draftsmen had been 
eclectic in their choice of source material and often found inspiration 
in legal encyclopedic literature; the Louisiana redactor proved no 
different. On both sides of the Francophone Atlantic, codifiers were 
drawing on similar sources. 
 
 40. Similar evidence from the Digest provisions on licitation confirms the 
drafter’s use of Lerasle rather than the Paris folio. Compare Dig. Orl., Bk. III, Tit. 
I, Art. 173–174 with 5 Encyc. Juris. 493, ¶¶ 8, 7, 10 (‘Licitation’) (almost verba-
tim equivalence between Digest and Lerasle for all three articles); contra 9 L’En-
cyc. 485, ¶¶ 8, 7 (missing equivalent provision for Art. 174). 
 41. See Rodolfo Batiza, The French Revolution and Codification: Comment 
on the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and the Napoleonic Codes, 18 
VALP. U. L. REV. 675, 678 (1984) (emphasis supplied). 
 42. See Rodolfo Batiza, Origins of Modern Codification of the Civil Law: 
The French Experience and Its Implications for Louisiana Law, 56 TUL. L. REV. 
477, 526 (1982) [hereinafter Modern Codification]. 




IV. THE ENCYCLOPEDIST CODE: THE REDACTOR’S PEDAGOGICAL 
MOTIVATIONS EXAMINED 
What circumstances motivated Moreau Lislet to resort to French 
legal encyclopedic sources when drafting the Digest? How and in 
what contexts did he use encyclopedia entries as verbatim source 
material? The following analysis reveals three discernible patterns 
that help answer these questions. First, Moreau Lislet copied defini-
tions from encyclopedia entries in order to introduce basic civil law 
concepts to a general or lay readership, usually at the beginning of 
Digest titles and chapters. Second, the redactor used French legal 
encyclopedia entries to supplement Digest provisions taken from 
the Code civil, projet, or Domat, especially where he felt the French 
codes or Domat insufficient or inadequate. Third, the drafter copied 
encyclopedic source material to clarify the purpose behind new 
code articles or resolve potential ambiguities in existing practice. 
While distinct, Moreau Lislet’s patterns of verbatim borrowing col-
lectively reveal a concerted effort to provide Louisiana’s bench and 
bar with a civil code that was both didactic in spirit as well as ex-
planatory in style.  
A. Examples of Encyclopedic Borrowing: Introductory Rules and 
Definitions 
The most common reason Moreau Lislet consulted French legal 
encyclopedia entries was to reproduce their initial descriptions of 
basic civil law concepts. Indeed, as the Appendix’s table of sources 
indicates, a substantial number of the Digest’s introductory rules and 
definitions come not from the French codes or Domat, but from Ler-
asle, Denisart, and Guyot. These include the Digest’s definitions for 
biens and choses in Book II, Title I (copied from Lerasle);43 usufruit 
in Book II, Title III (Denisart);44 partage, licitation, and rapports a 
 
 43. Dig. Orl., Bk. II, Tit. I, Art. 1–3; cf. 2 Encyc. Juris. 43, ¶ 1 (‘Biens’); 2 
Encyc. Juris. 620, ¶¶ 5, 9 (‘Chose’). 
 44. Dig. Orl., Bk. II, Tit. III, Art. 1–4; cf. 4 ANCIEN DENISART 665, num. 1–
2, 5–6 (‘Usufruit’). 




succession45 in Book III, Title I (Lerasle), atermoiement (“respite”) 
in Book III, Title XVI (either Guyot or Lerasle);46 hypothèque in 
Book III, Title XIX (Lerasle);47 and the articles on occupation from 
Title XX in Table 1 (also from Lerasle). 
Importantly, Moreau Lislet placed these encyclopedia-derived 
definitions at the beginning of Digest titles and chapters, where they 
typically serve as didactic prelude to more-detailed provisions bor-
rowed from the Code civil and projet. Strategic placement of ency-
clopedia-derived definitions at the beginning of Digest titles sug-
gests the drafter’s intention to provide readers with relevant back-
ground and context for the legal rules that follow. The four chapters 
in Book II, Title I (of Things) offer a representative example of Mo-
reau Lislet’s layering of source material for this purpose. Title I be-
gins with Chapter 1’s basic rules regarding the distinction between 
categories of things, which the redactor largely copied from intro-
ductory paragraphs in Lerasle’s entries on ‘Biens’ and ‘Choses’.48 
In contrast, Chapters 2–4 provide more-specific rules regulating im-
moveables, moveables, and estates; according to Batiza’s 1971 
study, Moreau Lislet borrowed these provisions from the Code civil 
and projet.49 
Not surprisingly, many of the Digest of 1808’s encyclopedia-
derived articles were subsequently incorporated into the Civil Code 
of 1825, and several survive practically unchanged in the present 
 
 45. Partage: Dig. Orl., Bk. III, Tit. I, Art. 157–158; cf. 6 Encyc. Juris. 475, 
¶¶ 1, 12–13 (‘Partage’). Licitation: Dig. Orl., Bk. III, Tit. I, Art. 172–174; cf. 5 
Encyc. Juris. 493, ¶¶ 1, 7–8, 10 (‘Licitation’). Rapports a succession: Dig. Orl., 
Bk. III, Tit. I, Art. 192; cf. 7 Encyc. Juris. 186, ¶ 1 (‘Rapport a succession’). 
 46. Dig. Orl., Bk. III, Tit. XVI, Art. 1–3, 5; cf. 1 Encyc. Juris. 540, ¶¶ 1–4 
(‘Atermoiement’); but cf. 3 BATIZA 1974, at 112 (proposing “a.v. (in part)” attrib-
ution to Guyot). 
 47. Dig. Orl., Bk. III, Tit. XIX, Art. 2; cf. 5 Encyc. Juris. 99, § 1, ¶¶ 1–2 
(‘Hypothèque’). 
 48. Title I, chapter 1 contains 12 articles. Art. 1–3, 5–6, and 10–12 come ver-
batim or almost verbatim from the Encyclopédie méthodique. See Appendix (sup-
porting references). Batiza traced Art. 7 to Domat, while Art. 4, 8 and 9 reflect 
Roman rules found in the Institutes. See Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 62. 
 49. Chapters 2–4 contain 22 articles. According to Batiza, all but three pro-
visions (Art. 13, 19 and 29 (in part)) follow the Code civil and/or Projet of Year 
VIII. See Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 63.  




code.50 For example, current Civil Code Articles 449 (“Common 
things may not be owned by anyone. They are such as the air and 
the high seas. . . .”) and 1295 (“Definitive partition is that which is 
made in a permanent and irrevocable manner. . . .”) are both intro-
ductory provisions about basic civil law concepts that Moreau Lislet 
originally took verbatim from the Encyclopédie méthodique two 
centuries ago.51 In fact, Lerasle’s own entries are themselves “al-
most verbatim” equivalents of Diderot’s originals, thus making the 
Paris folio the indirect source for both provisions.52 Characteristic 
of the Digest’s Lerasle-derived material, the two Civil Code articles 
 
 50. Others have only recently been eliminated. For example, in Book III, Ti-
tle XVIII (of Pledge), Moreau Lislet originally copied Articles 4 (“One may pawn 
every moveable which is into commerce.”) and 19 (“The debtor who takes away 
the pledge without the creditor’s consent, commits a sort of theft.”) from Lerasle’s 
entry on ‘Gage’. Both provisions were first published in Diderot’s Encyclopédie 
and both survived more or less unchanged until the 2015 revision of the Civil 
Code’s title on pledge.  
 “One may pawn”: Compare language in LA. CIV. CODE art. 3154 (1870), a mod-
ified version of Dig. Orl. Bk. III, Tit. XVIII, Art. 4, which was copied verbatim 
from 4 Encyc. Juris. 679, ¶ 5 (‘Gage’), which was in turn copied verbatim from 7 
L’Encyc. 414, ¶ 7 (‘Gage’).  
 “Sort of theft”: Compare language in LA. CIV. CODE art. 3173 (1870), which is 
identical with Dig. Orl. Bk. III, Tit. XVIII, Art. 19, which had been copied almost 
verbatim from 4 Encyc. Juris. 680, ¶ 14 (‘Gage’), and, indirectly, 7 L’Encyc. 414, 
¶ 34 (‘Gage’). For discussion of the revision of the title on pledge, see Michael 
H. Rubin, Ruminations on the Louisiana Law of Pledge, 75 LA. L. REV. 697 
(2015).  
 51. “Common things”: Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 449 (2019) with 
Dig. Orl., Bk. II, Tit. I, Art. 3: “Things which are common are those whose prop-
erty belongs to nobody, and which all men may freely use, comfortably to the use 
for which nature has intended them, such as air, running water, and the sea and its 
shores.” Article 3 in the Digest was adopted with minor variation as Article 441 
in the 1825 Civil Code, and as Article 450 in the Revised Civil Code (1870). See 
3 LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES, Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of Louisiana 255 
(1940). Article 450 was revised again in 1978, but the phraseology and meaning 
have not changed substantially. See A.N. YIANNOPOULOS & RONALD J. SCALISE 
JR., PROPERTY § 3:2, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (5th ed. 2019). 
 For Article 3’s dependence on Encyclopédie méthodique, compare Dig. Orl., Bk. 
II, Tit. I, Art. 3 and 2 Encyc. Juris. 620, ¶ 9 (‘Chose’). 
Partition: Compare LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1295 (2019) with Dig. Orl. Bk. III, 
Tit. I, Art. 158: “Every partition is either definitive or provisional; definitive par-
tition is that which is made in a stable and irrevocable manner.”  
 For Article 158’s dependence on the Encyclopédie méthodique, compare Dig. 
Orl. Bk. III, Tit. I, Art. 158 and 6 Encyc. Juris. 475 ¶¶ 12–13 (‘Partage’). 
 52. Cf. 3 L’Encyc. 374, ¶ 7 (‘Choses’); 12 L’Encyc. 85, ¶¶ 23–24 (‘Partage’).  




are illustrative rather than regulative; they read more like the ency-
clopedia entries that inspired them than modern codified legislation. 
B. More Examples of Encyclopedic Borrowing: Supplementing the 
French Code and Domat 
Another common reason Moreau Lislet turned to French legal 
encyclopedic literature when drafting Digest articles was to augment 
rules taken from the Code civil or Domat. Supplementation took two 
forms. First, the drafter often used verbatim extracts from encyclo-
pedia entries to expound or amplify more-succinct provisions bor-
rowed from the French code or the jurisconsulte auvergnat. For ex-
ample, according to Batiza’s 1971 study, Moreau Lislet copied most 
of Book III, Title XVIII’s twenty-seven articles on pledge from the 
Code civil and/or the Projet of Year VIII.53 Unbeknownst to Batiza, 
the Encyclopédie méthodique’s entry on ‘Gage’ accounts for the rest 
of the title’s provisions.54 The intercalation of Title XVII’s encyclo-
pedia-derived articles with the French Code’s provisions is typical 
of the drafter’s conservative technique of supplementation: Moreau 
Lislet used Lerasle’s description of the rights and duties of debtor 
 
 53. See source attributions in Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 125: Articles 1, 
5–9, 12–14, 16–17, 22–27 (copied verbatim or almost verbatim from the French 
code and projet) and Articles 2–3, 11 (substantially influenced by these sources).  
 54. See Appendix (identifying Lerasle as verbatim or almost verbatim source 
for Articles 4, 10–11, 15, 18–21). In contrast, Batiza’s 1971 study had proposed 
Pothier’s treatise on Nantissement and Domat’s Loix Civiles as non-verbatim 
“substantially influential” sources for most of the missing articles. See Batiza 
1971, at 125 (attributing Articles 4 and 15 to “substantial influence” of Pothier; 
Articles 10 and 18–21 to “substantial” or “partial” influence of Domat). However, 
when the Encyclopédie méthodique source material is properly taken into account, 
Pothier and Domat become superfluous as “actual sources” for Title XVIII. In-
deed, it seems strange that Moreau Lislet would have relied on Pothier verbatim 
in several other titles of the Digest but used only the non-verbatim concepts from 
the French jurist’s treatise on Nantissement for the Digest’s articles on pledge. 
The identification of these articles’ “actual sources” in French encyclopedic liter-
ature confirms this intuition.  




and creditor to augment, rather than modify, the Code Napoléon’s 
provisions on pawns and antichresis.55 
Second, Moreau Lislet regularly formed single (composite) arti-
cles for the Digest by combining fragments from the Code civil or 
Domat with verbatim extracts from Lerasle. The drafter typically did 
so by inserting encyclopedia-derived language between or immedi-
ately after extracts from Domat or articles from the French Code, 
thereby elucidating or interpreting the more-laconic provisions in 
the Napoleonic legislation or the Loix Civiles. At the same time, the 
drafter’s unusual method sometimes led to integrated provisions that 
subtly changed the original meaning of the ancien droit or post-Rev-
olutionary sources. Tables 2–4 on the following pages provide a sur-
vey of the drafter’s creative approach using examples taken from 
Book II, Title III, Article 27 (standard of care for usufructuary); 
Book III, Title I, Article 206 (collation of goods); and Book III, Title 
XVII, Article 4 (scope of arbitrability). 
 
Table 2.  
 
Dig. Orl. II.3.27 
Dig. Orl. 1808, Book II, 
Title III, Art. 27 
Domat’s Loix Civiles, 
Part. I, Liv. I, Tit. XI, 
Sect. IV, n. III (1723) 
8 Encyc. Juris. 159, § II, 
¶ 11 (‘Usufruit’) (1789) 
[1] L’usufruitier doit con-
server les choses dont il a 
l’usufruit et en avoir le 
même soin que prend un 
bon père de famille de ce 
qui est à lui. 
 
[=1] Le troisiéme en-
gagement de l’usufrui-
tier est de conserver les 
choses dont il a l’usu-
fruit, & d’en avoir le 
même soin que prend 
un bon pere de famille 









 55. That is, the articles taken from Lerasle do not contradict the Code civil’s 
general provisions on pawn and antichresis, which Moreau Lislet otherwise fol-
lowed. See Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 125–26. 




 [2] Ainsi il est respon-
sable des détériorations 
qui proviennent de son 
dol, de sa faute ou de sa 
négligence. 
[=2] L’usufruitier est 
responsable des détério-
rations qui proviennent 
de son dol, de sa faute ou 
de sa négligence. 
 
Table 3.  
 
Dig. Orl. III.1.206 
Dig. Orl. 1808, Bk. III, 
Title I, Article 206 
7 Encyc. Juris. 187, § I 
(‘Rapport a succes-
sion’) (1787) 
Code civil, Article 854  
[1] Néanmoins tous les 
actes faits par un ascen-
dant et dont quelques-uns 
de ses descendans ressen-
tent de l’avantage, ne sont 
pas sujets à rapport; il n'y 
a que ceux par lesquels 
l’ascendant fait passer 
quelque chose de ses 
biens à quelqu’un de ses 
descendans, par une voie 
couverte et indirecte. 
[2] Ainsi il n’est pas dû 
de rapport pour les asso-
ciations faites sans 
fraude, entre l’ascendant 
et l’un de ses descendans 
légitimes; lorsque les con-
ditions en sont prouvées 
d’une manière certaine. 
[3] Il en est de même de 
toutes les obligations à 
[p. 187, ¶ 3] [=1] Il 
faut cependant remar-
quer que tous les actes 
d’un père ou d’une 
mère, dont quelqu’un 
de leurs enfans [sic] 
ressent quelque avan-
tage, ne sont pas sujets 
à rapport; il n’y a que 
ceux pour lesquels les 
père & mère sont pas-
ser quelque chose de 
leurs biens à quelqu’un 
de leurs enfans par une 
voie couverte & indi-





[p. 189, ¶ 8] [=3] Les 













[=2] 854. Pareillement, il 
n’est pas dû de rapport 
pour les associations 
faites sans fraude entre le 
défunt et l’un de ses héri-
tiers, lorsque les condi-
tions en ont été réglées 
par un acte authentique. 
 




titre onéreux et des actes 
de commerce que le fils 
passe avec son père, les-
quels ne donnent ouver-
ture au rapport, que 
lorsqu’il s’y trouve de la 
part du père, une inten-
tion expresse ou tacite 
d’avantager son fils, et 
qu’en même-tems il sort, 
par ce moyen, quelque 
chose du patrimoine de 
l’un pour entrer dans ce-
lui de l’autre. 
onéreux, & les actes de 
commerce que le fils 
passe avec son père, ne 
donnent ouverture au 
rapport que lorsqu'il 
s’y trouve, de la part 
du second, une inten-
tion expresse ou tacite 
d’avantager le premier, 
& qu’en même temps il 
sort par ce moyen, 
quelque chose du patri-
moine de l’un, pour en-
trer dans celui de 
l’autre. 
 
Table 4.  
 
Dig. Orl. III.17.4 
Dig. Orl. 1808, Book III, 
Title XVII, Art. 4 
Domat’s Loix Civiles, 
Part. I, Liv. I, Tit. 
XIV, Sect. I, n. IV 
(1723) 
3 Encyc. Juris. 113, ¶ 6 
(‘Compromis’) (1783) 
[1] On peut compromettre, 
en général, de tous diffé-
rens, ou seulement de 
quelques-uns, en particu-
lier,  
[2] comme aussi on peut 
compromettre sur un pro-
cès à mouvoir, de même 
que sur un procès déjà mû, 
et généralement, de toutes 
choses qui concernent les 
[=1] On peut compro-
mettre ou en general de 
tous differens, ou seule-
ment de quelques-uns 







[=2] On peut compro-
mettre sur un procès à 
mouvoir, de même que 
sur un procès déjà mû, 
& généralement de 
toutes choses qui 




parties, et dont elles peu-
vent disposer.  
concernent les parties, 
& dont elles peuvent 
disposer. 
 
As the three composite articles in Tables 2–4 demonstrate, Mo-
reau Lislet generally used Lerasle to modify or amplify Domat 
and/or the Code civil, rather than the other way around. For example, 
in Book II, Title III, Moreau Lislet copied the first clause of Article 
27 from Domat’s Loix Civiles, while the second clause he took ver-
batim from the Encylopédie méthodique’s entry on ‘Usufruit’. The 
additional language from Lerasle principally serves to explicate, ra-
ther than qualify, Domat’s usufructuarial standard of care, specify-
ing that liability will arise from waste due to fraud, default, or neg-
ligence. Likewise, in Article 206, the redactor “sandwiched” Article 
854 in the Code civil between two verbatim fragments taken from 
Lerasle’s entry on ‘Rapport a succession’; again, the fragments 
merely illustrate additional applications or contexts for the French 
Code’s rule. Finally, in drafting Article 4, Moreau Lislet paired Do-
mat’s articulation of the principle of party autonomy in arbitration 
with Lerasle’s litany of circumstances in which parties may submit 
disputes to third-party neutrals. The result is Article 4’s broad pre-
sumption in favor of arbitrability. Atypically, the composite provi-
sion has gone beyond both Domat’s original principle of contractual 
freedom and Lerasle’s description of the various contexts in which 
it is advisable to compromise in order to enshrine a definite policy 
in favor of informal dispute resolution. 
C. Even More Examples of Borrowing: Unsolicited Legal Advice 
Versus Clear Legal Rules  
The final appeal of French legal encyclopedia entries for Moreau 
Lislet was their treasury of insights into the nuances of legal prac-
tice. As legislative texts, the French Civil Code and the Projet of 
Year VIII were necessarily concerned with the positing of clear legal 




rules. These rules were typically expressed in a short, epigrammatic 
style.56 In contrast, French legal encyclopedic literature contained 
lengthier descriptions of how legal institutions functioned in their 
everyday context. In the same spirit and for similar reasons, Moreau 
Lislet occasionally copied informative extracts from legal encyclo-
pedia entries directly into the Digest, where they served to empha-
size best practices or provided helpful legal advice.   
Book III, Title XVII (of Arbitration) provides an example of this 
perhaps surprising aspect of the redactor’s technique. In Title XVII, 
Moreau Lislet copied both Articles 24 and 25 from ¶¶ 5–6 in the 
Encyclopédie méthodique entry on ‘Arbitre’.57 The structure and 
style of the two articles reflect the original encyclopedia entry’s 
competing impulses to articulate broader legal principles while also 
providing readers with practical help. For example, Article 24’s first 
clause explains that the arbitrators’ power to decide disputes is de-
pendent on the terms of the submission (what the civil law calls the 
contract of compromise), while the second clause goes on to warn 
parties seeking to refer disputes to amicable compounders (arbitra-
tors who decide ex aequo et bono) to do so explicitly in the initial 
agreement to arbitrate.58 Otherwise, the Digest cautions, the 
 
 56. See, e.g., Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of Codifi-
cation, 48 LA. L. REV. 1073, 1088 (1988) [hereinafter Principles] (“The phrase-
ology of codes . . . shows certain traits. The expression of the rules of law is gen-
erally direct and impersonal.”) (describing imperative style as sine qua non of 
code phraseology).  
 57. Compare Dig. Orl., Bk. III, Tit. XVII, Art. 24–25 and 1 Encyc. Juris. 409, 
¶¶ 5–6 (‘Arbitre’). 
 58. Note that the Encyclopédie méthodique’s implicit presumption against 
amicable composition was contrary to pre-Purchase Spanish law. See, e.g., CURIA 
PHILIPICA 434, num. 13 (2 vols., 1797) [hereinafter Cur. Phil.] (“Arbitros [i.e., 
regular arbitrators] se dicen los que proceden, y determinan segun derecho; y 
arbitradores [i.e., amicable compounders] los que lo hacen á su arbitrio, 
conforme una ley de Partida. Y si por el Compromiso no consta si fue hecho en 
árbitros, ó arbitradores, se presume ser hecho en arbitradores, segun Lanfranco 
de Oriano, y Parladorio.”) (emphasis supplied). The rule in Curia Philipica had 
not changed by the mid-nineteenth century. See 1 JOAQUÍN ESCRICHE, 
DICCIONARIO RAZONADO DE LEGISLACIÓN Y JURISPRUDENCIA 327 (2d. ed. 1838) 
(“No resultando del compromiso si se han nombrado árbitros ó arbitradores, se 
presume haberse nombrado arbitradores. . . .”).  




arbitrators run the risk of exceeding their power and their award will 
be null: 
Art. 24. [1] Les arbitres ne peuvent excéder les bornes du 
pouvoir qui leur est donné, à peine de nullité de leur sen-
tence; [2] cependant, si les parties les ont autorisés à pronon-
cer, comme amiables compositeurs, ou selon la bonne foi et 
suivant l’équité naturelle, sans les astreindre à la rigueur de 
la loi, alors ils ont la liberté de retrancher quelque chose du 
bon droit de l’une des parties, pour l’accorder à l’autre, et de 
prendre un milieu entre la bonne foi, et l’extrême rigueur de 
la loi.59  
The hybrid purpose and structure of Article 25 is similar. While 
the first clause of Article 25 reaffirms Article 24’s general principle 
that arbitral power is circumscribed by the terms of the compromise, 
the second clause suggests that, as a consequence of this principle, 
parties to arbitration “ought” to, as a precaution, insert a “general 
clause” in the initial agreement to arbitrate, lest new disputes arise 
during the pendency of the submission which the arbitrators lack 
authority to resolve: 
Art. 25. [1] Le pouvoir des arbitres ne peut s’étendre que sur 
les choses contenues dans le compromis, [2] ainsi lorsqu’il 
survient de nouveaux chefs de contestation, un nouveau pou-
voir est nécessaire; pour éviter cet inconvénient, il faut insé-
rer dans le compromis une clause générale, pour donner aux 
arbitres le pouvoir de juger toutes les contestations qui pour-
raient survenir entre les parties, pendant le cours de l’arbi-
trage.60    
Importantly, neither Article 24 nor Article 25 directly state the 
legal rules that underly the practical advice being given. Indeed, it 
is not even clear that a legal rule is being articulated. Instead, the 
principle that arbitrators depend for their authority on the terms of 
the parties’ initial contract to compromise is disarmingly prefatory 
for a civil code, while important legal presumptions against amica-
ble composition and plenary power to resolve future-arising disputes 
 
 59. Dig. Orl., Bk. III, Tit. XVII, Art. 24.  
 60. Id. at Art. 25.  




are left implicit in the broader context of advice about best practices 
when drafting agreements to arbitrate. Moreau Lislet may have later 
had second thoughts about including such material in a modern civil 
code. In the course of the 1825 Civil Code revision process, the Di-
gest’s primary redactor, along with fellow revision commissioners 
Edward Livingston and Pierre Derbigny, re-worded Article 25’s 
original language to resemble legislation rather than advice from a 
legal encyclopedia, while Article 24’s second clause (about the need 
to appoint amicable compounders explicitly) was removed from the 
Code altogether.61  
V. BATIZA’S 1971 AND 1974 NON-VERBATIM SPANISH SOURCE 
ATTRIBUTIONS RECONSIDERED: SOME FRENCH LEGAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIC COUNTER-EVIDENCE 
In addition to revealing Moreau Lislet’s pedagogical ambitions 
for Louisiana’s first codification project, the presence of a substan-
tial corpus of French legal encyclopedic source material is also rel-
evant to the lingering debate over the extent of Spanish law’s influ-
ence on the Digest’s redaction. In particular, comparison of the pre-
sent study’s verbatim legal encyclopedic source attributions with 
Batiza’s 1971 and 1974 proposed non-verbatim sources indicates 
that many of Batiza’s original non-verbatim (especially Spanish) 
source attributions are unreliable. Indeed, the Appendix alone iden-
tifies at least two dozen Digest provisions that Moreau Lislet copied 
verbatim from Denisart, Guyot, and Lerasle’s encyclopedias but 
which Batiza wrongly attributed to the Siete Partidas, Curia 
Philipica, and Febrero Adicionado, as well as the Corpus Juris 
 
 61. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 3089 (1825) (successor to Article 25) (“The 
authority of arbitrators extends only to the things contained in the submission, 
unless it has been stated that they shall have power to decide all disputes which 
may arise between the parties in the course of arbitration.”). See also 1 LA. LEGAL 
ARCHIVES, Projet of the Civil Code of 1825, at 360 (1939) (Moreau Lislet, Liv-
ingston, and Derbigny recommending suppression of Article 24’s second clause); 
cf. LA. CIV CODE art. 3088 (1825) (successor to Article 24) (“Arbitrators can not 
exceed the power which is given to them; and if they exceed it, their award is null 
for so much.”).  




Civilis.62 The origins of Batiza’s mistaken source attributions are 
easily discovered and, more importantly, suggest that his 1971 and 
1974 studies systematically over-estimated the role of Spanish-lan-
guage “actual sources” in the compilation of the Digest.  
A. Batiza’s 1971 Methodology Revisited  
According to his 1971 study, Batiza began his initial search for 
the Digest’s “actual sources” (verbatim and non-verbatim) with the 
redaction’s “two main [French-language] trails,” the Code civil and 
the Projet of Year VIII; early in his search, Batiza also consulted 
Domat and Pothier’s commentaries, as well as ancien droit legisla-
tion.63 In a 1995 article, Batiza boasted that he had “spent only about 
six months” consulting sources for his 1971 study.64 Nevertheless, 
using this relatively-small selection of French-language works, 
Batiza was able to locate the “verbatim” or “almost verbatim” (i.e., 
literal) sources for most of the Digest’s 2,000 or so provisions.65 
Furthermore, in his 1974 revised study, Batiza expanded his search 
to also include Desgodets’ Loix des bâtimens (1748), Guyot’s réper-
toire, and Ferrière’s 1773 translation of Justinian’s Institutes, where 
he found additional evidence of direct borrowing.66 Yet, if Batiza 
consulted other genres of French-language source material, or 
French legal encyclopedias besides Guyot’s, he did not 
acknowledge doing so.67 In any event, his 1971 and 1974 studies 
failed to identify multiple verbatim sources, including Lerasle and 
Denisart.  
Having prematurely exhausted his search for the Digest’s 
French-language verbatim sources, Batiza next proceeded to inves-
tigate possible non-verbatim sources for the Digest’s remaining 
 
 62. See Appendix (supporting references).  
 63. See Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 10 & n.39. 
 64. See Batiza, Justinian’s Institutes, supra note 5, at 1646. 
 65. See Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 10–12. 
 66. See BATIZA 1974, supra note 4, at [i].  
 67. Cf. Batiza 1971, supra note 1, Appendix A (Table of Sources of the Civil 
Code of 1808) (listing sources consulted/used). 




provisions.68 Despite uncovering considerable evidence of Moreau 
Lislet’s preference for copying French-language materials, Batiza 
frequently looked to Roman and Spanish texts to explain articles 
with no apparent equivalent in the small number of French-language 
sources he had already consulted. As a result, Batiza ultimately 
traced hundreds of Digest articles to non-verbatim provisions in the 
Siete Partidas, Curia Philipica, and Febrero, as well as the Corpus 
Juris Civilis.69 However, while Batiza’s “verbatim” and “almost 
verbatim” French-language sources had been phraseologically iden-
tical or nearly-identical with language found in the Digest, and 
therefore provided verifiable evidence of direct borrowing, Batiza’s 
proposed non-verbatim (especially Spanish and Roman) sources re-
sembled the Digest at the level of conceptual similarity only (i.e., 
these sources addressed the same legal rules as the Digest provision 
in question but were distinct in terms of style and terminology).70  
Whether Moreau Lislet ever consulted or copied these sources is of-
ten a matter of speculation, and as the present study indicates, some-
times verifiably wrong. 
B. The Pascal-Batiza Debate 
What motivated Batiza to turn to non-verbatim Spanish and Ro-
man sources where the French Code, projet, and Domat were silent? 
Ironically, the answer probably lies with the “Spanish thesis”71 of 
Batiza’s principal antagonist, Robert Pascal. Prior to Batiza’s 1971 
study, Louisiana legal historians had offered several theories to 
 
 68. See Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 10.  
 69. Id. at 12–13 (discussing 200+ Spanish source attributions). 
 70. Id. at 12 & n.48 (acknowledging that “the accuracy of some of the figures 
given in the text for these [non-verbatim] sources is not as precise as that of the 
French sources because of the difference in language and the number of instances 
where several possible sources may account for one single provision.”). Although 
Batiza did identify several articles in Book III, Title V (on marriage contracts) 
that had been translated from Febrero. See BATIZA 1974, supra note 4, at 103 
(identifying Febrero as “actual source” (in translation) of Articles 12–14).  
 71. For use of “Spanish thesis” to describe Pascal’s position, see Palmer, su-
pra note 32, at 1069. 




explain Moreau Lislet and Brown’s apparent deviation from their 
supposed mandate to make Spanish law the “ground work” of their 
“civil code.”72 Proponents of the Spanish thesis, including Pascal, 
argued that the redactors used French-language sources such as the 
French Civil Code and Domat primarily out of convenience (as the 
Digest was to be compiled in the French language), but only where 
the French sources’ rules were interchangeable with those of Span-
ish law. Where French and Spanish law differed, the redactors mod-
ified the French sources, used Spanish ones, or composed articles 
from scratch.73 According to this theory, the Digest of 1808 is a met-
aphorical “Spanish girl in French dress”; although the redaction may 
be phraseologically French, the underlying legal institutions remain 
substantively Spanish.74  Opponents of the Spanish thesis have in-
creasingly disagreed with this characterization of the Digest as a 
French-language restatement of “Spanish-Roman law.” In particu-
lar, John Cairns has argued persuasively that the drafters were “not 
constrained by a narrow positivist view of the sources they could 
employ” when drafting the Digest. Rather, after the manner of Eu-
ropean codifiers, they used French-language and other sources more 
creatively, to intentionally modify Louisiana civil law.75 
 
 72. For a contemporaneous overview of the “Pascal-Batiza” debate, see A.N. 
Yiannopoulos, The Early Sources of Louisiana Law: Critical Appraisal of a Con-
troversy, in LOUISIANA’S LEGAL HERITAGE 102–03 (E.F. Haas ed., 1983). See 
also Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Recent Discovery of Moreau Lislet’s System 
of Omissions and Its Importance to the Debate over the Sources of the Digest of 
1808, 49 LOY. L. REV. 301, 302–07 (2003) (briefly reviewing controversy and 
need for more comparative research to resolve conflicting claims).  
 73. Robert Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza, 
46 TUL. L. REV. 603, 606 (1971); see also LEVASSEUR, supra note 16, at 176–77 
(articulating similar theory of redaction). 
 74. See Pascal, supra note 73, at 606; see also Robert Anthony Pascal, Of the 
Civil Code and Us, 59 LA. L. REV. 301, 303 (1998) (26th Tucker Lecture) (refer-
ring to Digest of 1808 as “Spanish girl in French dress”).  
 75. See JOHN W. CAIRNS, CODIFICATION, TRANSPLANTS, AND HISTORY: LAW 
REFORM IN LOUISIANA (1808) AND QUEBEC (1866) xv, 77, 439 (2015); see also 
Olivier Moréteau, Codification, Transplants and History: Law Reform in Louisi-
ana (1808) and Quebec (1866) (book review), 4 COMP. LEGAL HIST. 94 (2016) 
(positively reviewing Cairns’ work and placing it within the history of Pascal-
Batiza debate). 




Notwithstanding his well-known insistence on the Digest of 
1808’s overwhelming French-language provenance, Batiza’s own 
views were probably somewhere in the middle. Writing before 
Cairns, Batiza did not have the benefit of the former’s demonstration 
(mostly based on evidence in Book I) of the redactors’ use of 
French-language sources as vehicles for departing from previously-
applicable Spanish paradigms.76 Although Batiza acknowledged 
several provisions in the Digest where Moreau Lislet had supple-
mented Spanish rules with French ones,77 he still assumed that the 
redactors followed Spanish law on most major points. In fact, in a 
1982 article, Batiza offered an assessment of Moreau Lislet’s likely 
approach to French and Spanish source material that is substantially 
compatible with the Spanish thesis’ hypothesis that the drafters 
turned to Spanish authorities where the Code civil, Domat, and 
Pothier were inconsistent with existing Louisiana law: 
The first Louisiana codification in 1808, disregarding the ex-
plicit instructions of the Legislature in a manner that can 
nevertheless be justified on technical grounds, drew upon 
French rather than Spanish or Castilian sources: the French 
Civil Code (1804), the Projet of the Year VIII (1800), the 
Custom of Paris, and the writings of Domat and Pothier. 
Only exceptionally, where Spanish law differed substan-
tially from the French, did this first codification use 
sources such as the Siete Partidas, the Recopilación de Cas-
tilla, the Fuero Real, Febrero Adicionado, the Curia 
Philipica, and Roman Law.78 
Batiza’s presumption that Moreau Lislet avoided adopting 
French rules that “differed substantially” from Spanish alternatives 
 
 76. See generally CAIRNS, supra note 75 (providing exhaustive comparative 
analysis of Book I’s provisions on family relations and master and servant and 
rejecting both Pascal’s hypothesis that Digest of 1808 is restatement of Spanish 
law as well as opposite characterization of the Digest as a “slavish copy” of the 
Code civil).  
 77. See, e.g., Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 29 (“The Spanish system of com-
munity of acquets or gains (sociedad de ganancias) that appears in the Code, ra-
ther than being opposed to the French system of communauté, supplements it.”). 
 78. See Batiza, Modern Codification, supra note 42, at 601 (emphasis sup-
plied). 




appears to have also influenced the methodology behind his 1971 
study. At the very least, the Spanish thesis’ characterization of the 
nature of the legislature’s instructions decisively informed the 
Tulane law professor’s strategy for finding the Digest’s supposed 
non-verbatim sources. 
C. Batiza’s 1971 Methodology Reexamined: An Illustrative Excur-
sus on the “Actual Sources” of Book III, Title XVII 
Batiza’s proposed “actual sources” for Book III, Title XVII (on 
Arbitration or Compromise) provide a useful illustration of how the 
1971 study’s flawed methodology led Batiza to over-estimate the 
importance of Spanish-language sources.  Unlike most of Book III, 
Title XVII’s rules on compromis, the French contract of arbitra-
tion,79 have no equivalent in the Code civil: much to Planiol’s an-
noyance, the French drafters had dealt with the subject of arbitration 
separately, in the French Code of Civil Procedure (1806).80 For this 
reason, Moreau Lislet could not borrow provisions from the Code 
civil or the projet when drafting Title XVII’s thirty-five articles, as 
he had done elsewhere in Book III.  Moreover, although Batiza’s 
1971 study identified ten articles that Moreau Lislet had copied di-
rectly from Domat’s Loix Civiles, these accounted for less than a 
third of Title XVII’s provisions.81 Faced with a dearth of verbatim 
source material in the “usual places” (Code civil, projet, Domat), 
Batiza characteristically turned his search for Title XVII’s 
 
 79. The usage in the Digest is distinct from that of the 1825 and subsequent 
civil codes, as well as current Louisiana practice, in which compromise is a sup-
posedly civilian translation of a settlement agreement, or “transaction.” See, e.g., 
N. Stephan Kinsella, A Civil Law to Common Law Dictionary, 54 LA. L. REV. 
1265, 1297 (1994) (equating “transaction or compromise” with “settlement of a 
lawsuit”). In the Digest, it is always a contract to arbitrate.   
 80. See CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] [Code of Civil Procedure] arts. 
1005–1013 (1806) (Fr.); see also 2 MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL 
LAW 324 (La. State L. Inst. trans., 11th ed. 1939) (stating that “[a]rbitration is a 
very important contract which is not regulated by our civil laws; it is only inci-
dentally envisaged in Art. 1989 of the Civil Code and regulated by a few insuffi-
cient dispositions of the code of procedure. . . .”). 
 81. See Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 122–25 (tracing Title XVII Articles 1, 
9–10, 14, 26–28, 34, and parts of Articles 4 and 29 to Domat’s Loix Civiles).  




remaining provisions to plausible Spanish-language alternatives, ul-
timately attributing most of the title’s non-Domat material to the 
possible influence of non-verbatim, conceptually-relevant provi-
sions in the Tercera Partida, Febrero, and Curia Philipica.82 Indeed, 
Batiza traced nearly all of the 1971 study’s proposed Curia Philipica 
source material to Title XVII alone.83 According to Batiza’s study, 
Title XVII was, in quantitative terms, the most “Spanish” or “Span-
ish-influenced” title in the entire Digest.84   
In retrospect, however, such a high proportion of Spanish source 
material almost certainly reflects Batiza’s approach, not the redac-
tor’s. The Appendix reveals that at least six of Title XVII’s twenty-
five non-Domat articles were actually taken from the Encyclopédie 
méthodique (all or parts of Articles 3 and 4, 12, 24–25, and 33),85 
not Pothier, the Tercera Partida, Febrero, and/or Curia Philipica (as 
Batiza had proposed),86 while Article 6 was copied from the Loix 
Civiles (not Curia Philipica),87 and Article 8 was taken from Den-
isart.88 Likewise, Batiza’s 1971 attribution of Article 7’s three-
month default term for compromises to the non-verbatim influence 
 
 82. See id. (attributing Articles 3, 5–7, 11–13, 15–18, 21–22, and 25 to non-
verbatim “substantially” or “partially influential” provisions in the Partidas, Fe-
brero, and/or Curia Philipica).  
 83. Apart from Title XVII (17 provisions), Batiza found possible influences 
of Curia Philipica only in Book III, Titles III (1 provision) and XVI (1 provision). 
See id. at Appendix B. 
 84. That is to say, the proportion of Title XVII’s articles that Batiza attributed 
to the non-verbatim influence of Spanish, and only Spanish, sources is higher than 
that of any other title in the Digest. See id.  
 85. See 3 Encyc. Juris. 113, ¶¶ 4, 9, 16 (sources for first two clauses in Title 
XVII, Article 3, second clause of Article 4, first part of Article 33); 1 Encyc. Juris. 
409, ¶¶ 5–6 (sources for part of Article 12 and all of Articles 24–25). 
 86. See Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 122–25 (attributing Article 3 to Febrero 
Adicionado/Curia Philipica, Article 12 to Tercera Partida, Febrero Adicionado 
and/or Curia Philipica, Article 24 to Pothier on Procédure Civile/Curia Philipica, 
Article 25 to Curia Philipica, and Article 33 to Pothier, Febrero Adicionado 
and/or Curia Philipica).  
 87. In the 1971 study, Batiza wrongly traced Article 6 to the “substantial in-
fluence” of both the Loix Civiles and Curia Philipica. See Batiza 1971, supra note 
1, at 123. In the 1974 study, Batiza revised his earlier source attribution to include 
only Domat, the article’s “almost verbatim” source. See 3 BATIZA 1974, supra 
note 4, at 113.  
 88. See 1 ANCIEN DENISART 490, ¶ 50 (8th ed. 1773) (‘Compromis’) (near-
verbatim source for Article 8). 




of Domat, Febrero, and/or Curia Philipica is unsupportable.89 In the 
Loix Civiles, Domat assumes that a compromise without a fixed 
deadline is invalid; in the Spanish sources (including both Curia 
Philipica and Febrero), arbitrators have three years, not three 
months, to render an award.90 Instead, the “actual source” for Article 
7 is very likely Article 1007 in the recently-promulgated French 
Code of Civil Procedure, which states that “Le compromis sera va-
lable, encore qu’il ne fixe pas de delai; et, en ce cas, la mission des 
arbitres ne durera que trois mois, du jour du compromis.”91   
In other words, once Domat, Lerasle, Denisart, and the French 
code of procedure are taken into account, the probable “Spanish-
 
 89. See Dig. Orl., Bk. III, Tit. XVII, Art. 7 (“If the compromise does not limit 
any time, the power of the arbitrators may continue in force during three months 
from the date of the compromise unless the parties agree to revoke it.”); Batiza 
1971, supra note 1, at 123 (identifying Domat, Febrero, Curia Philipica as Article 
7’s “substantially influential” sources). 
 90. The rule in Domat: “It is usual, and even necessary, in Compromises, to 
fix a time within which the Arbitrators shall pronounce their Award . . . because 
it would not be just that it should be in the power either of the Arbitrators, or 
Parties, to put off the Final Decision for ever.” 1 JEAN DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN 
ITS NATURAL ORDER 224 (W. Strahan trans., 1722). The Spanish sources: “[I]f 
the parties had fixed no time at which the judgment was to be rendered; then we 
say the arbitrators ought to render it, as soon as possible; so that not more than 
three years shall elapse. . . .” 1 THE LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 98–99 (L. Mo-
reau Lislet & Henry Carleton trans., 1820) (reproducing 3 Part. Tit. IV ley 27); 
see also Cur. Phil., supra note 58 (repeating same three-year rule); JOSÉ FEBRERO, 
LIBRERÍA DE ESCRIBANOS Part. I, Cap. XIII, § 1, num. 10 (1789) (same); 
ESCRICHE, supra note 58, at 527 (three-year default rule unchanged in middle of 
nineteenth century).  
 91. CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] [Code of Civil Procedure] art. 1007 
(1806) (Fr.). The French Code of Procedure’s three-month rule appears to be 
novel. Most ancien droit authorities state that a compromis without a stated dead-
line was not valid (following Domat) or at least revocable. See, e.g., ROBERT JO-
SEPH POTHIER, TRAITÉ DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE (1776), Part. II, Ch. IV, Art. II, ¶ 1 
(listing deadline as required term for valid compromise); GUY DU ROUSSEAUD DE 
LA COMBE, RECUEIL DE JURISPRUDENCE CIVILE 24 (4th ed., 1746) (declaring com-
promise without a term revocable). On the other hand, the Toulouse advocate 
Marc-Antoine Rodier acknowledged several minority opinions: “d’autres qu’ils 
doivent prononcer le même jour; . . . d’autres enfin soutiennent qu’ils peuvent 
prononcer jusqu’à révocation du compromis, ou du moins dans les trois ans de la 
date du compromis,” while Mongalvy states in his Traité de l’arbitrage (1837) 
that some ancien droit authors had held that compromises could last up to 30 years 
in certain circumstances. See MARC-ANTOINE RODIER, QUESTIONS SUR L’ORDON-
NANCE DE LOUIS XIV Tit. XXVI, Art. VIII, question 3 (1769); S.C.T. MON-
GALVY, TRAITÉ DE L’ARBITRAGE EN MATIÈRE CIVILE ET COMMERCIALE 162 
(1837). 




ness” of Title XVII’s non-verbatim source material is significantly 
reduced, while almost half of the Digest’s proposed Curia Philipica 
source material is rendered hypothetical at best. This does not mean 
that the redactor did not consult Spanish sources when drafting Title 
XVII’s articles (it is entirely possible that he did). However, in most 
instances, the French legal literature Moreau Lislet found in his own 
law library would have been sufficient for his work. Moreover, at 
least with respect to Article 7’s three-month default term and Article 
24’s presumption against amicable composition, Spanish sources 
were clearly not “substantially” influential.92 More than the drafter’s 
preference for the style of the Code Napoléon or the convenience of 
the new French Code as a model is needed to explain Moreau Lis-
let’s repeated reliance on contradictory French source material in an 
area of private law where Spanish law had a well-developed, preex-
isting body of legal rules. 
D. The “Spanish Thesis” Re-re-examined 
While Batiza’s purported Spanish source attributions (both in 
Title XVII and elsewhere in the Digest) were quantitatively insig-
nificant relative to Moreau Lislet’s extensive borrowing from the 
French Code, projet, and Domat, their scattered presence throughout 
Batiza’s reconstruction of the Digest’s source material has neverthe-
less created the impression that there is indeed a “Spanish-Roman” 
substrate to the Digest, often without supporting comparative evi-
dence. Inadvertently or not, Batiza’s findings have therefore helped 
sustain the Spanish thesis’ central premise that the drafters worked 
(or believed that they were working) on an Iberian canvas to paint 
the “girl in French dress.” The mistaken attribution of French legal 
encyclopedia-derived articles to non-verbatim Spanish sources no 
doubt also explains Batiza’s otherwise curious conclusion that the 
 
 92. See supra note 58 (discussing French background to Article 24 and con-
trary rules in Spanish sources). 




redactor’s use of “Spanish law . . . gives the Code a somewhat di-
dactic character.”93 
At present, further research is needed to ascertain the full extent 
of French-language source material in the Digest of 1808. There are 
likely French-language verbatim sources that Moreau Lislet copied 
but which have not yet been identified (such as law dictionaries), 
and there are also missing verbatim source attributions for French-
language materials that Batiza did consult.94 Until scholars have 
identified and exhaustively searched all of the Digest’s French-lan-
guage sources for verbatim source material, Batiza’s non-verbatim 
attributions to Spanish sources should, except where comparative 
evidence supports them,95 be treated with caution. In the meantime, 
it is safe to assume that, because the Digest was originally written in 
French, not Spanish, future discoveries of overlooked verbatim 
source material will come disproportionately at the expense of 
Batiza’s non-verbatim attributions to Spanish-language materials.    
VI. CONCLUSIONS: THE PEDAGOGICAL ARCHITECTURE OF 
LOUISIANA’S CIVIL CODES  
As earlier sections have indicated, the supposed “cosmopolitan-
ism” of the Digest’s source material has probably been over-empha-
sized.96 While Moreau Lislet’s work was necessarily comparative, 
he generally preferred to copy French-language texts whenever 
 
 93. See Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 28.  
 94. For example, the “actual source” for Bk. I, Tit. IX, Art. 15 is likely the 
“almost verbatim” equivalent Article 503 in the Code Napoléon. In contrast, 
Batiza’s 1971 study proposed “substantially influential” provisions in Pothier’s 
treatise on Personnes and Blackstone’s Commentaries. Cf. Batiza 1971, supra 
note 1, at 62. 
 95. E.g., with respect to ganancial property or the law of successions.  
 96. See, e.g., Batiza 1971, supra note 1, at 28 (claiming that “the variety of 
sources used in drafting the Code gives it a cosmopolitan and distinctive flavor 
that differentiates it from either of its two principal models [the Projet and the 
Code Napoléon].”); see also Vernon Valentine Palmer, Sounding the Retreat: The 
Exit of Spanish Law in Early Louisiana 1805-1808, 31 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 121, 
146 (2017) (stating of the 1971 study that “Batiza’s research showed too that the 
drafters drew upon English, French, and Spanish writers such as Blackstone, Do-
mat, Febrero, and Pothier. Clearly this was a cosmopolitan selection from across 
national legal systems.”). 




possible. The redactor had thousands of articles to draft, and time 
was of the essence. The immediate need for efficiency suggests that 
he relied on a relatively small number of French-language materials 
rather than exhaustively research all the extant Spanish legislation 
or translate a substantial portion of it.97  As Batiza’s 1971 study es-
tablished, the Code civil, the projet, and Domat’s Loix Civiles were 
Moreau Lislet’s most important sources. All three texts provided 
useful civilian models of structure and French-language phraseol-
ogy, while Domat had the added advantage of being both explicitly 
sanctioned by the legislature and widely available in a popular Eng-
lish translation.98  
In contrast, French legal encyclopedia entries supplemented the 
principal sources. Moreau Lislet had used Lerasle, Denisart, and 
Guyot in everyday legal practice, and he was therefore familiar with 
their strengths and weaknesses. During the drafting process, these 
sources would have facilitated easy comparison of definitions and 
rules penned by reputable French authorities. Moreau Lislet may 
also have resorted to these sources to improve his own understand-
ing of unfamiliar provisions in the Code Napoléon, itself a novel 
compromise between Roman law and ancien droit.99 Knowing that 
fellow practitioners and ordinary citizens would require the same 
 
 97. This is hardly surprising given the state of Spanish law at the time of the 
Digest’s redaction. According to John Tucker, the various Spanish codes, fueros, 
and ordenanzas in force “constituted a tremendous volume of legislation applica-
ble to Louisiana,” collectively “compris[ing] 23 volumes of 89 books of 1,543 
titles containing 20,335 laws.” See John Tucker, Code and the Common Law in 
Louisiana, 29 TUL. L. REV. 739, 743 (1955) (relying on GUSTAVUS SCHMIDT, THE 
CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO 102 (1851)). 
 98. See Levasseur, supra note 28, at 620 & n.9 (for text of 1806 “declaratory 
act” making Loix Civiles authoritative in Louisiana courts). The first English 
translation of Domat was Strahan’s 1722 edition. See DOMAT, supra note 90; see 
also Peter Stein, The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 
52 VA. L. REV. 403, 406–07 (1966) (discussing popularity of Strahan’s translation 
in common-law jurisdictions during early 19th century).  
 99. See, e.g., Bergel, Principles, supra note 56, at 1078 (describing the Code 
civil as a “technical compromise between customary law and Roman law.”). 




elucidation likely prompted him to copy material from Guyot, Den-
isart, and Lerasle directly into the Digest.100 
There were also important legal-cultural reasons for supple-
menting the French Code and Domat with other genres of civilian 
legal literature: the finished Digest was to be applied not only by 
civilians, but also by lawyers trained in the common law. Between 
1804 and 1810, Louisiana’s judges were mostly American immi-
grants,101 and, if the Creole legislators’ Manifesto of 1806 is to be 
credited, some knew neither Spanish nor French.102 Moreover, in 
the period immediately after the Purchase, lawyers from common-
law states quickly outnumbered Francophone advocates, bringing 
with them divergent legal vocabularies and methodologies.103 In this 
environment, the civilian approach to gap-filling could hardly be as-
sumed, and lacunae in the new code would inevitably be cause of 
future confusion or even intentional misinterpretation. The 
 
 100. On this point, see Barenot, infra note 111, at 16 (stating that “With the 
advent of the Revolution and in the years that followed the promulgation of the 
Civil Code, the main purpose of lexicographical works [both dictionaries and ré-
pertoires] was to facilitate the passage from the ancien droit to legal ecosystems 
constructed on new paradigms.”). 
 In fact, the practice of using French encyclopedia entries to interpret the Digest 
was not unheard of in the years after the Louisiana Code’s promulgation. See, e.g., 
Morse v. Williamson & Patton’s Syndics, 3 Mart. (o.s.) 282, 284 (La. 1814) 
(Court referred to Encyclopédie méthodique to interpret legal term in Digest); 
Amory v. Boyd, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 414, 415 (La. 1818) (Derbigny, J quoting Guyot’s 
répertoire on subject of mandate). Sometimes legal argument rested on competing 
entries from two French legal encyclopedias. See, e.g., De Armas, supra note 19, 
at 140 (Moreau Lislet invoking Nouveau Denisart to undermine plaintiff’s reli-
ance on Guyot’s répertoire). 
 101. See, e.g., Henry P. Dart, The History of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 
133 La. liii (1913). 
 102. See quoted language in LEVASSEUR, supra note 16, at 63: “The present 
composition of the courts, the judges presiding over them and the jurists who 
plead before them being almost all strangers to the French language and still 
more to the language in which the greater part of the laws of this country are 
written [i.e., Spanish] . . . renders indispensable . . . in the French and the English 
language, a complete collection of the laws governing us.” (emphasis supplied). 
 103. Elizabeth Gaspard, The Rise of the Louisiana Bar: The Early Period, 
1813-1839, 28 LA. HIST. 183, 187 (1987) (discussing immigration of Anglo-
American lawyers into Louisiana during early statehood period). 




occasional encyclopedist definition or gloss would help mitigate this 
possibility.104  
In 1936, Mitchell Franklin famously stated that the difference in 
length between the Louisiana Code and the Code civil was largely 
the difference between a “code that was a code, and a code that was 
a code, a law-school and doctrine all at once.”105 Over the years, 
Louisiana legal scholars have frequently agreed with Franklin’s as-
sessment, although they typically express dissatisfaction with the 
code’s dual orientation.106 As David Hoskins and Shael Herman ex-
plain, “almost by reflex, civilians shy away from the suggestion that 
the code performs legitimate pedagogical functions. . . . The code is 
legislation, not doctrine, not a text-book of the civil law.”107  How-
ever, while Franklin’s (and later scholars’) juxtapositions of “code” 
and “doctrine” are no doubt descriptively accurate with respect to 
the Digest’s (and its successors’) unusual style, they are also too 
anachronistic. At the time of the Digest’s redaction, the paradig-
matic status of the Code Napoléon, and mid-nineteenth century 
French law’s categorical distinction between the role of legislation, 
jurisprudence, and commentary in shaping legal norms, was still in 
 
 104. For similar insights on the relationship between the Digest’s pedagogical 
style and the common law threat, see Palmer, supra note 32, at 1076 (concluding 
that the “framers felt it was necessary to incorporate a good deal of doctrine within 
the code itself. The judges to whom these instructions issued were all trained in 
the common law and would have brought with them a completely different meth-
odological inclination.”).  
 105. See Mitchell Franklin, Some Observations on the Influence of French 
Law on the Early Civil Codes of Louisiana, in LE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS : LIVRE-
SOUVENIR DES JOURNÉES DU DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 841 (1936) (quoted in Shael 
Herman & David Hoskins, Perspectives on Code Structure: Historical Experi-
ence, Modern Formats, and Policy Considerations, 54 TUL. L. REV. 987, 1042 
(1980)). 
 106. See, e.g., Justice Rost’s comments in Egerton v. Third Municipality of 
New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 435, 437 (1846) (“Definitions are, at best, unsafe guides 
in the administration of justice; and their frequent recurrence in the Louisiana 
Code, is the greatest defect in that body of laws.”); see also THOMAS E. CARBON-
NEAU, DAVID A. COMBE, AND SHAEL HERMAN, THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE: A 
HUMANISTIC APPRAISAL 202 (1981) (criticizing code as “much more verbose” 
than French prototype and lamenting drafters’ decision to “make of the Civil Code 
a pedagogical tool by incorporating long passages from venerable treatises.”).  
 107. Herman & Hoskins, supra note 105, at 1041.  




the making.108 As Jean Maillet observed elsewhere, it was the pro-
cess of codification itself that first “pushed into the background 
other legal sources and techniques,” substituting an almost “entirely 
statutory” conception of law for earlier models.109 Having been 
trained in the ancien droit, Moreau Lislet’s practical experience with 
French legislation was not the “self-sufficient” civil code of com-
mon law stereotype110 or the French Exegetical School, but the ear-
lier period’s patchwork of ordonnances and jurisprudence, eluci-
dated by myriad commentaries, legal encyclopedias, and works of 
legal lexicography (the earlier “sources and techniques” described 
by Maillet). The varied nature of the sources Moreau Lislet used to 
redact the Digest naturally reflects this unique historical context, 
when French legal culture was on the cusp of a crucial transfor-
mation in its own understanding of codified legislation’s relation-
ship to other forms of legal literature.  
From Moreau Lislet’s point of view, extracts from the Ency-
clopédie méthodique, Décisions nouvelles, and Répertoire de juris-
prudence are therefore not awkward additions to Louisiana’s first 
civil code, ornamenting (or adulterating) a “pure” civilian codifica-
tion. Rather, legal encyclopedias and French-style civil codes should 
be understood as existing along an evolving continuum between old 
 
 108. See ANDRÉ CASTALDO Y YVES MAUSEN, INTRODUCTION HISTORIQUE AU 
DROIT §§ 1918 to 1920 (5th ed., 2019) (“Désireux d’expliquer (et de s’expliquer 
sans doute à soi-même) le Code Napoléon, les premiers commentateurs ne se sa-
tisfont pas d’une simple paraphrase du texte; ce n’est que plus tard, au cours du 
XIXe siècle, que l’expression d’«exégèse» prendra tout son sens à cet égard.”) 
(contrasting post-codification renaissance in doctrinal analysis and continuity of 
ancien droit methodologies of interpretation with mid-century French law’s re-
treat to pure exegesis); see also James Gordley, Myths of the French Civil Code, 
42 AM. J. COMP. L. 459, 491–92 (1994) (suggesting that mid-19th century French 
Exegetical School responsible for the “myth” of the French Civil Code’s self-
sufficiency and independence vis-à-vis natural law and doctrine).  
 109. See Jean Maillet, Historical Significance of French Codification, 44 TUL. 
L. REV. 681, 688–89 (1970) (discussing methodological changes wrought by cod-
ification); see also Pierre Legrand, Strange Power of Words: Codification Situ-
ated, 9 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 28–29 (1994) (agreeing that codification “simul-
taneously serves to close the past and open the future,” substituting new genres or 
approaches to interpretation for older ones).  
 110. See also Aniceto Masferrer, French Codification and “Codiphobia” in 
Common Law Traditions, 34 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 20–21 (2019).  




and new models of making civil law comprehensible, with Moreau 
Lislet’s final redaction falling somewhere in the middle. Indeed, 
Pierre-Nicolas Barenot has recently proposed that the ancien droit 
“legal dictionaries, lexicons or repertoires” popular among French 
lawyers of Moreau Lislet’s generation should be regarded as eight-
eenth-century antecedents of modern codification, “for codes, like 
lexicographical works, aim at making the law more accessible, by 
bringing together and organizing separate legal texts in a single cor-
pus.”111 
According to the cultural historian Robert Darnton, Denis Dide-
rot’s original Encyclopédie had been offered to the French reading 
public as a “compendium of all knowledge”, an Enlightenment cor-
nucopia of abstract as well as technical information about a wide 
range of important subjects.112 In similar vein, the Avertissement to 
Lerasle’s volumes claimed with justification that the Encyclopédie 
méthodique: Jurisprudence would provide its readers with un sys-
tème complet du Droit in eight volumes.113  Although modern civil 
codes do not typically aspire to the same didactic achievement as 
legal encyclopedias, they nevertheless share a similar concern with 
comprehending the whole landscape of private law in a systematic 
arrangement.114  
 In the end, by blending codified legislation and ancien droit 
commentary with French legal encyclopedia entries, Moreau Lislet 
was able to compile a hybrid Digest-Code which was both legisla-
tive and didactic, one specially designed to meet the immediate le-
gal-cultural needs of an emerging mixed system.115 Perhaps as a 
 
 111. See Pierre-Nicolas Barenot, A View of French Legal Lexicography – Tra-
dition and Change from a Doctrinal Genre to the Modern Era, in LEGAL LEXI-
COGRAPHY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 13–14 (Máirtín Mac Aodha ed. 2014). 
 112. See Darnton, supra note 22, at 1352.  
 113. See Avertissement, supra note 21, at vi. 
 114. See, e.g., James Gordley, Codification and Legal Scholarship, 31 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 735, 735 (“Modern civil codes . . . are attempts to state the basic 
rules of private law comprehensively and systematically.”).  
 115. See generally Michael McAuley, The Pedagogical Code, 63 LA. L. REV. 
1293, 1297 (2003) (discussing the mixed legislative-pedagogical orientation of 
the Louisiana Civil Code). 




result, the Digest of 1808’s sui generis style and eclectic French-
language source material display a striking affinity for (and conti-
nuity with) the ancien droit models it supposedly supersedes, even 
as its structure and rules resemble its better-known Napoleonic pro-
totype.116 At the very least, the redactor’s choice of sources with 
respect to the genre of French legal literature he consulted (and cop-
ied) provides a valuable window into the complex aspirations be-




The Appendix is a list of source attributions for encyclopedia-
derived articles appearing in Louisiana’s first civil code, the Di-
gest of 1808. The Appendix is intended to be used as a supple-
ment to Appendix C in Rodolfo Batiza’s 1971 study, “The Loui-
siana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and Present Rele-
vance,” published in volume 46 of the Tulane Law Review.  For 
utility of comparison, this Appendix uses Batiza’s 1971 study’s 
categories of phraseological “resemblance” to describe the rela-
tionship between individual Digest provisions and French legal 
encyclopedic sources (e.g., “verbatim”, “almost verbatim”, “al-
most verbatim (in part)”, etc., usually abbreviated “v.”, “a.v.”, 
and “a.v. (in part)”).  The present study has adopted Batiza’s cat-
egories primarily for reasons of consistency, despite the inherent 
subjectivity of Batiza’s earlier approach.   
 
 116. In this last respect, the Louisiana drafter’s approach to codification re-
sembles that of some Latin American codifiers later in the same century, who also 
felt that the laconic Code civil, though admirable for its structure, nevertheless 
required a return to earlier models for supplementation. See, e.g., M.C. Mirow, 
Individual Experience in Legal Change: Exploring a Neglected Factor in Nine-
teenth-Century Latin American Codification, 11 SW. J.L. & TRADE IN THE AMER-
ICAS 301, 311 (2005) (“Finally, concerning the style of drafting of [the Chilean 
Civil Code], [Andrés] Bello noted that he sacrificed brevity (which he equated 
with the French code) to include examples and illustrations, a style that in his view 
was more like the method of the Siete Partidas.”) (quoting 12 ANDRÉS BELLO, 
OBRAS COMPLETAS DE ANDRÉS BELLO 21 (1954)). 




The following sources were consulted in preparing the Ap-
pendix: 
1. M. Lerasle, Encyclopédie méthodique : Jurisprudence (8 
vols., 1782–89) (= “Encyc. Juris.”) 
2. Jean-Baptiste Denisart, Collection de décisions nouvelles 
(vol. 1 = 8th ed., 4 vols., 1773; vols. 2-4 = 9th ed., 4 vols., 
1775) (= “Denisart”) 
3. Jean-Baptiste Denisart, Collection de décisions nouvelles 
(Calenge ed., 13 vols., 1783–1807) (= “Nouveau Denisart”) 
4. Joseph-Nicolas Guyot, Répertoire universel et raisonné de ju-
risprudence civile, criminelle, canonique et béneficiale (2d 
ed., 17 vols., 1784–85) (= “Guyot’s Répertoire”) 
5. Denis Diderot & Jean le Rond d’Alembert, Encyclopédie, ou 
dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers (1st 
ed., 28 vols., 1751–66) (= “Did. Encyc.”)  
 
A FINAL NOTE 
 
Not infrequently, encyclopedia entries found in Lerasle, Den-
isart, and Guyot resemble one another, often verbatim, making it 
difficult to know exactly which entry Moreau Lislet copied. Ver-
batim similarity in multiple encyclopedias is due to rampant bor-
rowing between ancien droit legal lexicographers during the rel-
evant period, as well as mutual dependence on shared sources 
from the middle of the 18th-century (especially Diderot’s first 
Encyclopédie). In these difficult cases, a “best guess” has been 
made on the basis of other evidence (often paragraph structure or 
sequence). Regardless, in all of these cases, the Digest appears to 
follow language taken from French legal encyclopedic literature 
rather than non-verbatim sources or Spanish law.  
 










*with indirect relationships 
to Diderot’s Encyclopédie 









Batiza, 1974 study 
proposed actual 
source, if revised 






Book II, Title 
I (Of things 
or estates) 
     
Article 1 
2 Encyc. Juris. 43, 








(vol. 3 in Sources 
1974, p. 38) 
“p.i.” (Institutes); 
“a.v. (in part)” 
(Guyot) 
Article 2 
2 Encyc. Juris. 620, 
¶ 5 in ‘Chose’; see also Bou-
cher d’Argis on ‘Choses’ in 3 





cera Partida (p. 
62) 
1971 sources and 
Guyot’s Répertoire 
(vol. 3, p. 38) 
“s.i.” 
Article 3 
2 Encyc. Juris. 620, 
¶ 9 in ‘Chose’; see also Bou-
cher d’Argis on ‘Choses’ in 3 









2 Encyc. Juris. 620, ¶ 11 in 
‘Chose’ 
a.v. (in part) 
Justinian’s Insti-
tutes, Tercera 
Partida (p. 62) 
1971 sources and 
Curia Philipica, 




2 Encyc. Juris. 621, ¶¶ 27, 29 
in ‘Chose’ 




Partida (p. 62) 
 “s.i.” 
Article 10 
2 Encyc. Juris. 620, ¶ 5 in 
‘Chose’ 






(vol. 3, p. 41) 
“s.i.” 
Article 11 
2 Encyc. Juris. 620, ¶ 6 in 
‘Chose’; see also Boucher 
d’Argis on ‘Choses’ in 3 Did. 
Encyc. 375, ¶ 11 (a.v. in part) 
v. 
Domat’s Loix 




1971 sources and 
Digest (vol. 3, p. 
41) 
“s.i.” 
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2 Encyc. Juris. 620, ¶ 7 in 
‘Chose’ 
s.i. 
Pothier on Choses 
(p. 63) 
1971 sources and 
Guyot’s Réper-
toire, Segunda Par-
tida (vol. 3, p. 41) 
“s.i.” 
Article 13 
2 Encyc. Juris. 620, ¶ 7 in 
‘Chose’ 
a.v. (first par.) 
Pothier on Choses 
(p. 63) 
1971 sources and 
French Civil Code, 
French projet, Do-
mat’s Loix Civiles, 
Guyot’s Répertoire 
(vol. 3, p. 41) 
“s.i. (first part)” 
(Pothier); “s.i.” 
(sources in 1974 
study) 
Book II, Title 
III (Of usu-
fruct, use and 
habitation) 
     
Article 1 
4 Denisart 665, num. 1 (‘Usu-
fruit’) 






Digest (p. 65) 
Guyot’s Répertoire 
(vol. 3, p. 42) 
“s.i.” (1971 
sources); “a.v. (in 
part)” (Guyot) 
Article 2 






1971 sources and 
Pothier on Douaire 
(vol. 3, p. 42) 
“s.i.” 
Article 3 








Digest (p. 65) 
1971 sources and 
Febrero Adicio-
nado (vol. 3, p. 42) 
“s.i.” 
Article 4 
4 Denisart 665, num. 6 (‘Usu-
fruit’) 
v. (first par.) 
Domat’s Loix 
Civiles (p. 65) 
1971 sources and 
Guyot’s Réper-
toire, Febrero Adi-
cionado (vol. 3, p. 
42) 
“s.i.” 
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Partida (p. 65) 
Pothier on 
Douaire, Febrero 




4 Denisart 666, num. 17 
(‘Usufruit’) 
a.v. Digest (p. 65)  “s.i.” 
Article 27 
Domat’s Loix Civiles (first 
par.); 8 Encyc. Juris. 159, § II, 
¶ 11 in ‘Usufruit’ (second 
par.) 
a.v. (both pars.) 
Domat’s Loix 






“a.v. (first par.)” 
Article 45 
8 Encyc. Juris. 160, § III, ¶ 1 
in ‘Usufruit’ or possibly 17 
Guyot 396, § III, ¶ 1 (first 
part); French Civil Code, arti-
cle 599 (second part) 
a.v. (both parts) 
French Civil 
Code, Domat’s 
Loix Civiles  
(p. 66) 
French Civil Code, 
article 599 (second 
part) (vol. 1, p. 45); 
first part unidenti-
fied 
“a.v. (in part)” 
Article 47 
8 Encyc. Juris. 160, § III, ¶ 3 
in ‘Usufruit’ or possibly 17 
Guyot 396, § III, ¶ 5 
a.v. 
Domat’s Loix 
Civiles (p. 66) 
 “p.i.” 
Article 50 
8 Encyc. Juris. 160, § III, ¶ 8 
in ‘Usufruit’ or possibly 17 
Guyot 396, § III, ¶ 10 
v. 




8 Encyc. Juris. 163, § V.III, ¶ 
1 in ‘Usufruit’ 
a.v. (in part) 
French projet, 




4 Denisart 668, num. 35 
(‘Usufruit’) 
a.v. (first part) 
French projet, 





tida (vol. 3, p. 46) 
“s.i.” 
Book II, Title 
IV (Of pre-
dial services 
or services of 
land) 
     










*with indirect relationships 
to Diderot’s Encyclopédie 









Batiza, 1974 study 
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Article 18 8 Encyc. Juris. 286–87, § VI, 
¶ 1 in ‘Voisinage’ 








8 Encyc. Juris. 287, § VI, ¶ 1 
in ‘Voisinage’ 
a.v. (first part); 





1971 sources and 
Tercera Partida, 
Guyot’s Répertoire 
(vol. 3, p. 48) 
“s.i.” (Domat); 
“a.v. (in part)” 
(Guyot) 
Book III, Ti-
tle I (Of suc-
cessions) 
     
Article 157 
6 Encyc. Juris. 475, ¶ 1 in 
‘Partage’; see also Boucher 
d’Argis on ‘Partage’ in 12 
Did. Encyc. 85, ¶ 1 (a.v.) 
a.v. 
Domat’s Loix Ci-
viles, Pothier on 
Successions (p. 
79) 
1971 sources, Sexta 
Partida, and 
Guyot’s Répertoire 
(vol. 3, p. 73) 
“s.i.” 
Article 158 
6 Encyc. Juris. 475, ¶¶ 13–14 
in ‘Partage’; see also Boucher 
d’Argis on ‘Partage’ in 12 




sions (p. 79) 
 “p.i.” 
Article 162 
3 Denisart 458, num. 8 (‘Part-
age’) 






sions (p. 80) 
1971 sources and 
Febrero Adicio-
nado (vol. 3, p. 73) 
“s.i.” 
Article 165 
6 Encyc. Juris. 475, ¶¶ 5–6 in 
‘Partage’; see also Boucher 
d’Argis on ‘Partage’ in 12 
Did. Encyc. 85, ¶¶ 5–6 (v.) 
v. 
Pothier on Succes-
sions (p. 80) 
 “s.i.” 
Article 171 
6 Encyc. Juris. 475, ¶ 4 in 
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d’Argis on ‘Partage’ in 12 
Did. Encyc. 85, ¶ 4 (a.v.) 
Loix Civiles, Po-
thier on Succes-
sions (p. 80) 
Partida, Fuero 
Real (vol. 3, p. 74) 
Article 172 
5 Encyc. Juris. 493, ¶ 1 in 
‘Licitation’; see also Boucher 
d’Argis on ‘Licitation’ in 9 
Did. Encyc. 485, ¶ 1 (v.) 
v. 
Pothier on Succes-
sions (p. 80) 
Guyot’s Répertoire 
(vol. 3, p. 75) 
“s.i.” (Pothier); 
“a.v. (in part)” 
(Guyot) 
Article 173 
5 Encyc. Juris. 493, ¶¶ 7–8 in 
‘Licitation’; see also Boucher 
d’Argis on ‘Licitation’ in 9 
Did. Encyc. 485, ¶¶ 7–8 (v.) 
(first par.) 
v. (first par.); a.v. 
(second par.) 
Domat’s Loix Ci-




(vol. 3, p. 75) 
“p.i.” (1971 
sources); “a.v. (in 
part)” (Guyot) 
Article 174 




Civiles (p. 80) 
 “s.i.” 
Article 177 
3 Denisart 460, num. 19 
(‘Partage’) 
a.v. (in part) 
French projet, 
French Civil Code 
(p. 80) 
1971 sources and 
Pothier on Succes-
sions (vol. 3, p. 75) 
“s.i.” 
Article 178 
3 Denisart 460, num. 20 
(‘Partage’) 
a.v. (in part) 
French projet, 







3 Denisart 460, num. 21 
(‘Partage’) 
v. 
Unidentified      
(p. 80) 
Pothier on Succes-
sions (vol. 3, p. 76) 
“p.i.” (Pothier) 
Article 181 




French Civil Code 
(p. 80) 
1971 sources and 
Pothier on Succes-





7 Encyc. Juris. 186, ¶ 1 in 
‘Rapport a succession’; see 
also Boucher d’Argis on ‘Rap-
port a succession’ in 13 Did. 




viles, Pothier on 
Successions       
(p. 81) 
1971 sources and 
Febrero Adicio-
nado (vol. 3, p. 77) 
“s.i.” 
Article 205 
7 Encyc. Juris. 187, § 1, ¶ 2 in 
‘Rapport a succession’ 
a.v. (in part) 
Pothier on Succes-
sions (p. 81) 
 “s.i.” 
Article 206 
7 Encyc. Juris. 187, § 1, ¶ 3 in 
‘Rapport a succession’ (first 
a.v. (all three 
pars.) 
Pothier on Succes-
sions (p. 82) 
French Civil Code, 
article 854 (second 
“s.i. (first par.)” 
(Pothier); “a.v. (in 
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par.); French Civil Code, arti-
cle 854 (second par.); 7 Encyc. 
Juris. 189, § I, ¶ 18 in ‘Rap-
port a succession’ (third par.) 
par.); other two 
pars. unidentified 




7 Encyc. Juris. 189, § I, ¶¶ 
11–13 in ‘Rapport a succes-
sion’ (second, third, and fourth 
pars.); see also Boucher d’Ar-
gis on ‘Rapport’ in 13 Did. 
Encyc. 801, ¶¶ 8–10 (a.v.) 
a.v. (second, 




Code, Pothier on 
Successions (p. 
82) 




(vol. 3, p. 80) 
“s.i.” 
Article 208 
7 Encyc. Juris. 189, § I, ¶ 16 
in ‘Rapport a succession’; see 
also Boucher d’Argis on ‘Rap-
port’ in 13 Did. Encyc. 801,   
¶ 13 (a.v., in part) 
a.v. (in part) 








nado (vol. 3, p. 80) 
“s.i.” 
Article 209 
7 Encyc. Juris. 192, § IV, ¶ 4 
in ‘Rapport a succession’ 
a.v. (in part) 
Pothier on Succes-
sions (p. 82) 
 “s.i.” 
Article 213 
7 Encyc. Juris. 192, § IV, ¶¶ 
8–10; 193, ¶ 11 in ‘Rapport a 
succession’ 
v. (in part) (first 
par.); v. (second 
and third pars.) 
Pothier on Succes-






7 Encyc. Juris. 193, § IV, ¶ 13 
in ‘Rapport a succession’ 
a.v. 
Pothier on Succes-
sions (p. 82) 
 “a.v. (in part)” 
Article 215 
7 Encyc. Juris. 193, 
§ IV, ¶¶ 14–16 in ‘Rapport a 
succession’ 
a.v. (in part) 
Pothier on Succes-
sions (p. 82) 
 
“s.i.” (1971 




7 Encyc. Juris. 193, 
§ IV, ¶¶ 17–19 in ‘Rapport a 
succession’ 
a.v. (first and 
second pars.); v. 
(third par.) 
French Civil 





study); “a.v. (in 
part)” (1974 
study) 
Bk. III, Title 
II (Of dona-
tions inter 
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2 Encyc. Juris. 699, ¶ 2 in 
‘Codicille’; see also Boucher 
d’Argis on ‘Codicille’ in 3 




viles, Pothier on 
Testamens, Sexta 
Partida (p. 87) 
1971 sources and 
Guyot’s Répertoire 
(vol. 3, p. 85) 
“s.i.” 
Article 84 
2 Encyc. Juris. 700, ¶ 10 in 
‘Codicille’; see also Boucher 
d’Argis on ‘Codicille’ in 3 
Did. Encyc. 587, ¶ 9 (a.v., in 
part) 
a.v. (in part) 
Pothier on Testa-
mens (p. 87) 
1971 sources and 
Sexta Partida (vol. 
3, p. 85) 
“s.i.” 
Article 85 







1971 sources and 
Febrero Adicio-
nado (vol. 3, p. 85) 
“s.i.” 
Article 86 
2 Encyc. Juris. 700, 
¶ 14 in ‘Codicille’ 
a.v. 
Domat’s Loix 




Bk. III, Title 
III (Of con-




     
Article 222 
1 Guyot’s Répertoire 144, ¶ 7 
in ‘Acte’ 





1 Guyot’s Répertoire 144, ¶ 7 
in ‘Acte’ 








     
Article 26 
4 Encyc. Juris. 35, ¶ 9 in 
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d’Argis on ‘Dot’ in 5 Did. En-




4 Encyc. Juris. 35, ¶ 10 in 
‘Dot’; see also Boucher d’Ar-
gis on ‘Dot’ in 5 Did. Encyc. 





French Civil Code 
(vol. 3, p. 104) 
“p.i.” 
Article 28 
4 Encyc. Juris. 35, ¶ 11 in 
‘Dot’; see also Boucher d’Ar-
gis on ‘Dot’ in 5 Did. Encyc. 
64, ¶ 15 (a.v., first part) 




1971 sources and 
Febrero Adicio-






4 Encyc. Juris. 35, ¶ 12; see 
also Boucher d’Argis on ‘Dot’ 
in 5 Did. Encyc. 64, ¶ 16 (a.v.) 
a.v. 







4 Encyc. Juris. 35, ¶ 13; see 
also Boucher d’Argis on ‘Dot’ 









Bk. III, Title 
VI (Of sale) 
     
Article 1 
Domat’s Loix Civiles (v.) 
(first par.); 2 Gabriel Argou, 
Institution au droit français 
189 (1773) (v.) (second par.) 
v. (both pars.) 
Domat’s Loix Ci-




 “v. (first par.)” 
Bk. III, Title 
XVI (Of res-
pite) 
     
Article 1 
1 Encyc. Juris. 540, ¶ 1 in 
‘Atermoiement’; see also 
Toussaint on ‘Atermoyement’ 
in 1 Did. Encyc. 798, ¶ 1 (a.v., 
in part) 
a.v. (in part) 
Pothier on Obli-
gations (p. 121) 
Guyot’s Répertoire 
(vol. 3, p. 112) 
“s.i.” (1971 
sources); “a.v. (in 
part)” (Guyot) 
Article 2 
1 Encyc. Juris. 540, ¶ 2 in 
‘Atermoiement’; see also 
v. (first and sec-
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Toussaint on ‘Atermoyement’ 
in 1 Did. Encyc. 798, ¶ 3 (a.v.) 





1 Encyc. Juris. 540, ¶ 5 in 
‘Atermoiement’ 




vile (p. 122) 
Guyot’s Répertoire 
(vol. 3, p. 112) 
“s.i.” (1971 
sources); “a.v. (in 
part)” (Guyot) 
Article 5 
1 Encyc. Juris. 540, ¶ 4 in 
‘Atermoiement’ 
a.v. (in part) 
Pothier on Procé-
dure Civile (p. 
122) 
Guyot’s Répertoire 
(vol. 3, p. 112) 
“s.i.” (1971 
sources); “a.v. (in 
part)” (Guyot) 
Article 6 
1 Encyc. Juris. 541, ¶ 12 in 
‘Atermoiment’ 
a.v. (first part) 
Pothier on Obli-
gations (p. 122) 
Guyot’s Répertoire 
(vol. 3, p. 113) 
“s.i.” (1971 
sources); “a.v. (in 
part)” (Guyot) 
Article 8 
1 Encyc. Juris. 542, ¶ 2 in 
‘Atermoiment’; see also Tous-
saint on ‘Atermoyement’ in 1 









     
Article 3 
3 Encyc. Juris. 113, ¶ 9 in 
‘Compromis’; see also Bou-
cher d’Argis on ‘Compromis’ 
in 3 Did. Encyc. 779, ¶ 10 
(a.v., first two pars.) 
a.v. (first two 




pica (p. 122) 
Guyot’s Répertoire 
(vol. 3, p. 113) 
“s.i.” (Spanish 
sources); “a.v. (in 
part)” (Guyot) 
Article 4 
Domat’s Loix Civiles (first 
clause); 3 Encyc. Juris. 113,   
¶ 6 in ‘Compromis’ (second 
clause); see also Boucher 
d’Argis on ‘Compromis’ in 3 
Did. Encyc. 779, ¶ 7 (a.v.) 
a.v. 
Domat’s Loix 
Civiles (p. 122) 
 “a.v. (first part)” 
Article 8 




viles, Pothier on 
Procédure Civile 
(p. 123) 
1971 sources and 
Guyot’s Répertoire 
(vol. 3, p. 113) 
“s.i.” 
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proposed actual 
source, if revised 







1 Encyc. Juris. 408, ¶ 2, 409, ¶ 
5 in ‘Arbitre’ 




pica (p. 123) 
 “s.i.” 
Article 24 
1 Encyc. Juris. 409, ¶ 5 in ‘Ar-
bitre’; see also Toussaint on 
‘Arbitre’ in 1 Did. Encyc. 579, 
¶ 6 (a.v., in part) 
a.v. (in part) 
Pothier on Procé-
dure Civile, Curia 
Philipica (p. 124) 
Curia Philipica 
(vol. 3, p. 115) 
“s.i.” 
Article 25 







tida (vol. 3, p. 116) 
“p.i.” 
Article 33 
3 Encyc. Juris. 113, ¶ 4 in 
‘Compromis’ 






1971 sources and 
Domat’s Loix Ci-
viles (vol. 3, p. 
116) 
“s.i.” 
Bk. III, Title 
XVIII (of 
pledge) 
     
Article 4 
4 Encyc. Juris. 679, ¶ 5 in 
‘Gage’; see also Boucher 
d’Argis on ‘Gage’ in 7 Did. 





1971 sources and 
Febrero Adicio-




4 Encyc. Juris. 679, ¶ 13 in 
‘Gage’; see also Boucher 
d’Argis on ‘Gage’ in 7 Did. 







4 Encyc. Juris. 679, ¶ 14 in 
‘Gage’ 
a.v. 
French projet (p. 
125) 
1971 sources and 
Pothier on Nantis-
sement, Tercera 




4 Encyc. Juris. 680, ¶ 7 in 
‘Gage’; see also Boucher 





1971 sources and 
Tercera Partida 
(vol. 3, p. 117) 
“s.i.” 
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Encyc. 414, ¶ 27 (a.v., first 
part only) 
Article 18 
4 Encyc. Juris. 680, 
¶ 11 in ‘Gage’; see also Bou-
cher d’Argis on ‘Gage’ in 7 
Did. Encyc. 414, ¶ 32 (a.v.) 
a.v. 
Domat’s Loix 
Civiles (p. 125) 
1971 sources and 
Pothier on Nantis-
sement, Tercera 
Partida (vol. 3, p. 
117) 
“s.i. (first part)” 
Article 19 
4 Encyc. Juris. 680, 
¶ 14 in ‘Gage’; see also Bou-
cher d’Argis on ‘Gage’ in 7 
Did. Encyc. 414, ¶ 34 (a.v.) 
a.v. 
Domat’s Loix 
Civiles (p. 125) 
 “s.i.” 
Article 20 
4 Encyc. Juris. 680, 
¶ 15 in ‘Gage’; see also Bou-
cher d’Argis on ‘Gage’ in 7 
Did. Encyc. 414, ¶ 35 (v.) 
v. 
Domat’s Loix 
Civiles (p. 125) 
1971 sources and 
Pothier on Nantis-









4 Encyc. Juris. 680, 
¶ 16 in ‘Gage’; see also Bou-
cher d’Argis on ‘Gage’ in 7 
Did. Encyc. 414, ¶ 36 (v.) 
v. 
Domat’s Loix 
Civiles (p. 125) 
 “s.i.” 




     
Article 2 5 Encyc. Juris. 99, § 1, ¶¶ 1–2 
in ‘Hypothèque’ 
a.v. (first par.); 
a.v. (in part) 
(second par.) 
Domat’s Loix 











Civiles (p. 126) 
1971 sources and 
French projet, 
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nado (vol. 3, p. 
118) 
Article 15 
5 Encyc. Juris. 99, § 1, ¶ 10 in 
‘Hypothèque’ 
v. (first par.) 
Domat’s Loix 
Civiles (p. 126) 
1971 sources and 
Pothier on Hy-
potheque, Febrero 
Adicionado (vol. 3, 
p. 119) 
“s.i.” 
Article 29 5 Encyc. Juris. 100, § 1, ¶¶ 8–
10 in ‘Hypothèque’ 
s.i. (first par.); 
a.v. (second 
par.); s.i. (third 
par.); a.v. (fourth 
par.) 
Domat’s Loix Ci-









viles, Pothier on 
Hypotheque (p. 
127) 
1971 sources and 
Febrero Adicio-
nado, Curia Phili-









potheque (p. 127) 
Domat’s Loix Civi-
les, Febrero Adi-









Code, Pothier on 
Hypotheque (p. 
127) 
1971 sources and 
Quinta Partida, 
Febrero Adicio-
nado (vol. 3, 
p. 121) 
“s.i.” 
Article 33 5 Encyc. Juris. 101, § 3, ¶¶ 4–
5 in ‘Hypothèque’ 
a.v. (in part) 
Pothier on Hy-
potheque (p. 127) 
Domat’s Loix Ci-






5 Encyc. Juris. 104, 
§ V, ¶ 16–17 
a.v. (first clause); 
v. (num. 1); a.v. 
(num. 2); a.v. (in 
part) (num. 3) 
Domat’s Loix 
Civiles (p. 128) 
 “s.i.” 
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Article 1 
6 Encyc. Juris. 247, ¶ 1 in ‘Oc-
cupation’; see also Boucher 
d’Argis on ‘Occupation’ in 11 
Encyc. 333, ¶ 1 (a.v.) 
a.v. 
Pothier on Pro-
priété (p. 130) 
 “s.i.” 
Article 2 





Institutes (p. 130) 
Guyot’s Répertoire 
(vol. 3, p. 123) 
“p.i.” 
Article 3 
6 Encyc. Juris. 247, ¶ 3 in ‘Oc-
cupation’; see also Boucher 
d’Argis on ‘Occupation’ in 11 
Did. Encyc. 333, ¶ 3 (a.v.) 
a.v. 
Pothier on Pro-
priété (p. 130) 
 “s.i.” 
 
 
 
 
